If you haven't heard, we're giving out free, fully smart contracts as a 5% rebate to anyone who purchases any of our research packages above the introductory novice $50 level. This is not your Daddy's rebate! The rebate actually gets larger as DB goes down in price. For those who may be coming late to the party, we can offer a 5x long gold (or even a long gold, short DB) smart contract rebate as well. Of course, the bulk of our research targets banks and entities other than DB, but I thought we'd make DB the subject of the rebate to drive the point home. Below is an actual contract crafted off of the price of a single share of DB for about 2 weeks.

Click here to explore and subscribe to our research. You will have to be willing to fully identify yourself and comply to the terms or our program (in essence, promise not to use the package for anything other than our rebate) in order to qualify for the rebate. Once the subsciption is paid for, email us to get started.

Oh yeah, if you haven't heard...

An Analysis of Deutsche Bank's Likely Recapitalization - German Tax Payer Bailout or German Bank Depositor Bail-in?

Deutsche Bank is going to need some money, and it's going to need some quite soon. The next two or three articles that I write will focus on why there is such a need. In a concerted effort to reduce or potentially eliminated the risk of taxpayer-funded bail-outs of European banks, the EU implemented a new “bail-in” regime beginning on January 1, 2016. As such, rules which require banks and certain systemically significant market participants in EU member states will have to write-down, cancel, convert into equity or otherwise modify certain unsecured liabilities if such steps are required to recapitalize the institution. What is the most bountiful unsecured liabilities of a bank? Read more...

Our next article will continue to hammer home the liklhood that DB will have to recapitalize, and where they probably WONT'T be getting the money from, as well as the likelihood it will come from someone who really didn't plan on giving it up (Ahem, depositors/savers/checking account holders). For those who are not yet convinced, peruse these related items...

The research and knowledge subscription module "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation" contains a full report of a very large European Deutsche Bank counterparty that faces a full 27% downside from current levels. It appears as if no one suspects a clue. It also contains much, much more (including at least 3 to 5 suspect banks). We can break this apart a la carte, if requested.

As excerpted:

The Macro Scene for Italian Banks

• Italian Banks:The Impact of Rising NPLs
   

   

  2m 45s

  
• The IMF has always been overly optimistic when it comes to Italy
   

   

  1m

  
• European banks' exposures to oil and gas
   

   

  2m

  
• Impact of Negative Interest Rate Policy
   

   

  15m

  
• Domiciles That Don't Look Good
   

   

  5m

  

This Bank as Ground Zero

• Putting the Ground Zero Bank into Perspective Re: Germany and the EU
   

   

  5m

  
• Ground Zero & It's Counterparties - Contagion Risk
   

   

  5m

  
• Ground Zero's Adverse Counterparty Risk Movement
   

   

  5m

  
• Systemic Risks
   

   

   

  

Susceptible Bank 1: Strong Country, Suspect Global Bank - Key Performance

• Negative Interest Rate Come to More Banks
   

   

  30m

  
• Susceptible Bank 1: Common Equity Returns
   

   

  4m

  
• 2Q2016 Basic Financial Results
   

   

  3m

  
• 2Q2016 Division-wise Performance
   

   

  5m

  
• 2Q2016 Net Interest Margin & Fee Income
   

   

  4m

  
• 2Q2016 Funds Under Management
   

   

  1m

  
• 2Q2016 Performance by Geography - Europe
   

   

  4m

  
• 2Q2016 Performance by Geography - North America
   

   

  2m 30s

  
• 2Q2016 Performance by Geography - Asia
   

   

  3m

  
• 2Q2016 Performance by Geography - Latin America & MENA
   

   

  1m

  
• 2Q2016 Gross loans and advances Personal/Consumer
   

   

  4m

  
• 2Q2016 Gross loans and advances Corporate/Commercial
   

   

  4m

  
• 2Q2016 Gross loans and advances Financial Loans
   

   

  1m 30s

  
• 2Q2016 In Summary
   

   

  45s

  

Susceptible Bank 1: Financial Modeling

• Susceptible Bank 1: Forensics,Valuation & Contagion Risk Assessment
   

   

  40m

  

Enter Italy's "Bear Stearns" 2Q2106

• The Metrics
   

   

  5m

  
• The Subprime Bank That Puts Bear Stearns to Shame
   

   

  5m

  
• Breakdown by sector of “off-statement of financial position”
   

   

  3m

  
• Parallels to Bear Stearns Before it Popped
   

   

   

  
• The Notional Value Argument Often Used By Entities Taking Large Losses
   

   

   

  
• In closing, excessive leverage brings us right back to 2008 again…
   

   

  3m

  

Enter Italy's "Lehman Brothers"

• Income Statement – 9M2015 vs 9M2014 – A short analysis
   

   

  2m

  
• Net Interest Income Analysis
   

   

  3m

  
• Customer Loan Quality
   

   

  3m

  
• Financial Assets
   

   

  3m

  
• Financial Derivatives
   

   

  3m

  
• Fair value adjustments in hedge accounting: details of income items - Banking Group
   

   

  2m

  
• Fair value adjustments in hedge accounting: details of income items
   

   

  2m

Americans are trained to know and to cherish the ideals of democracy and to believe in the American Dream which teaches most Americans that equal opportunity is here for all and that the chances for success for anyone lie within him/herself. None of us are taught to know and understand the American status system which is an important part of our American Dream and often makes the success story a brilliant reality. We all are trained in school to understand democratic ideals and principles and to believe in their fullest expression in American life, but we only learn by hard experience, often damaging to us, that some of the things we learned in early life exist only in our political ideals and are rarely found in the real world. We never learn these things in school, and no teacher teaches us the hard facts of our social-class system, and by extension, our capitalist class system.

We posit that one should study the basic facts of our status system and learn them through systematic, explicit training which will teach at least the adult student much of what he/she needs to know about our status order, how it operates, how he/she fits into the system, and what he/she should do to improve their position or make their present one more tolerable.

The primary drivers of social class mobility (i.e. Less stringent socio-economic stratification) are knowledge and access. Barriers to each of these is what drives socio-economic stratification and stifles social class mobility. For the extreme minority on the top of the socio-economic ladder, it is in their best interest to stifle mobility as much as possible, for mobility only represents:

1. 1) Downward movement for them, or
2. 2) Upward movement for those below them.

Any which way one can look at it, mobility, at best, represents displacement and lesser access, less capital, less relative status.

For those who are not members of the very top minority, socio-economic mobility usually means brighter outlooks – as long as said mobility is upward-facing (remember, mobility can be in both directions). As a matter of fact,

The primary products of Veritaseum are knowledge (through our interactively delivered research and opinion) …the lower you move down the socio-economic hierarchy, the more critical and leveraged the shift in socio-economic status becomes.... And access (through our patent-pending blockchain technologies) …

We are, in essence, the socio-economic mobility vendors.

Click here to access the Veritaseum Socioeconomic (Social Class) model... 

This model congeals basic materials about social class in America, identifies the multiple levels, and makes apparent the categories that can facilitate the movement from lower levels to higher ones, and vice versa. Its fundamental goals are to tell the reader (1) how to identify any class level, and (2) how to find the class level of any individual.

Social class enters into almost every aspect of our lives, into marriage, family, business, government, work, and play. It is an important determinant of personality development and is a factor in the kind of skills, abilities, and intelligence an individual uses to solve his problems. Knowledge of what it is and how it works is necessary in working with school records and the files of personnel offices of business and industry. What a woman buys to furnish her house and clothe her family is highly controlled by her social-class values. Keeping up with the Joneses and proving "I'm just as good as anybody else," although fit subjects for the wit of cartoonists because these slogans touch the self-regard of all Americans, are grim expressions of the serious life of most American families. The house they live in, the neighborhood they choose to live in, and the friends they invite to their home, consciously, or more often unconsciously, demonstrate that class values help determine what things we select and what people we choose as our associates.

This model provides a ready and easy means for anyone to equip him or herself with the basic knowledge of socio-economic class so that they can use this type of analysis whenever such factors are important in helping them to know a situation and adjust to it. I have used the model to help predict behavior in the investment real estate market, particularly the residential market in the NYC area where gentrification was rampant. It is now even more apropos, given the significant asset deflation, constriction and selective re-expansion of credit, and considerable shifting of wealth and resources within the US and worldwide.

The businesses of those who make, sell, and advertise merchandise as diverse as houses and women's garments, magazines and motion pictures, or, for that matter, all other mass products and media of communication, are forever at the mercy of the status evaluations of their customers, for their products are not only items of utility for those who buy but powerful symbols of status and social class. This model, and the more detailed and sophisticated one that shall follow, can greatly aid them in measuring and understanding the human beings who make up their markets. Note: This model has been geared towards the NYC Metropolitan area, hence may need to be fine-tuned for dissimilar rural, suburban or non-US areas.

The model has been built upon a modified version of the Index of Status Characteristics (I.S.C.).

Social Mobility

 Social class is defined (on this blog) as the amount of control one has over one's socio-economic environment. It is much more than money, although money is a large component. For instance, Barack Obama is in a higher class than Robert DeNiro or Michael Jackson, although Robert DeNiro and Jay-Z are most likely wealthier. Obama's higher class stems from his ability to exert more control over his socio-economic environment. The factors that this author uses to determine class combine (with the associated weights) to create a "socioeconomic index":

As you can see, wealth is the largest contributor to the class standing, and coincidentally it is the factor that is the most at risk in this current economic climate. I believe that there will be a significant entry into the upper middle class by those who were once firmly entrenched into the upper classes! While that may not seem like a big deal to many, it is damn big deal to those who are moving down the ladder. This also means, that there will be some space for others to move (relatively speaking) up the ladder. One man's (or woman's) misfortune is another's opportunity. I believe this blog can not only be used to insure and proof against downward mobility for those in the upper strata, but can also be used by those in the lower, middle and lower upper strata to rise upward a notch or even two. Social Mobility is the name of the game in times of severe dislocation - times like we will ikely be experiencing soon.

  Now, in term of wealth (not social class and influence, just wealth) we can split the upper strata into three different categories (there are only two above because of the other factors that come into play when social class or socioeconomic standing is taken into consideration). There is the poor wealthy, those guys and girls that are just a hair's breath from being pulled into the upper middle class strata due to marginal wealth. This would be the $1m to $10m net worth crowd, who rely on business profits, salary and investment returns for income. The next would be the middle strata of the wealthy, hailing between $10 t0 $100 million in Net Worth, and then there is the upper strata wealthy at above $100 million. Each of these three strata of wealth represent, in my opinion, distinct behavior tranches in terms of discretionary expenditures, investment, and politics and (what passes as, this is a story for another post) philanthropic activities.  

A trip to practically any decent sized yacht club or recreational vehicle port reveals the relatively stark differences in discretionary spending behavior. The first strata can be found in the 36 ft. to 68 ft. yacht docks (where a captain is optional, but not mandatory and you really don't need a crew). The second strata can be found 50 ft to 120 ft docks, where captains, crews and semi-custom fiberglass boats abound. The third strata are almost exclusively in the super yacht category, where the carrying cost alone for these (basically waste of money) fully custom built hulls and vehicles are about million a year to start with. You can also see the other social economic strata as well, upper middle class in the 20 to 35 ft boats, the middle and working class in the considerably smaller fishing boats - as opposed to the ultra fast Viking and Hatteras deep sea fishers, etc. It is an interesting and instructional study in social studies and anthropology just walking along your local docks! Once you are aware of how these things break down, you will see many settings in a different light.

Many of those in the higher strata would not be there if they had to compete on a more level playing ground. Alas, elimination of said level playing ground is a goal of those in the upper strata. The problem with that is that such behavior is good for the individual in the upper strata, but bad for society in general for it prevents efficient utilization of human capital. Basically, the best people don't get to do the most things, because they are blocked by those of lesser capability but greater access - access to infrastructure and access to knowledge.

Enter Veritaseum. Our business is to supply said access. We offer knowledge...

Access our knowledge through our proprietary research, analysis and education courses.

We offer access to infrastructure through our gateways to the peer-to-peer capital markets...

If one purchases our research (anything besides the introductory course) we will offer a 5x gold smart contract as a perk. Basically, we will give you a 5% rebate in the form of a Veritaseum smart contract that pays you the price of gold (or a gold index), levered 5x up to a stated maximum. This is a perfect way to both learn and get introduced into the new P2P capital markets and smart contracts.

This is the 4th installment of our public service announcements on Deutsche Bank subsidiary, Xetra-Gold's gold note offerings. Since a lot has been covered already, it's advisable that you read the first 3 articles to catch up:

1. Veritaseum Knowledge Exposes Frightening Counterparty Risk At Deutsche Bank for "Gold Investors"
2. Is Deutsche Bank Prepping for Fraud Charges Against It's Gold Derivative Products?

3. The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold

Now, that we have determined that Deutsche Bank subsidiary Xetra-Gold "may" not have been fraudulent, mainly because they stated in their prospectus things that contradict and befuddle the misleading things they stated in their marketing material, we are left to ponder, "Well, we know the offering was unethical, but was it illegal?" Unfortunately, I'm not a lawyer thus cannot accurately opine on such. Alas, I can speculate as a laymen. The Xetra-Gold derivatives were offered in the UK, as well as several other jurisdictions. Let's peruse the UK perspective via the FCA in the difference between clear and misleading financial advertising:

"Financial adverts and promotions can be misleading for many reasons, but there are some questions you can consider to help you spot and avoid misleading financial adverts, such as: ... Are there important points that are only shown in the small print?"

Hmm... Let's take a look at the Xetra-Gold advertisement, and cross reference it to it's prospectus:

You guys tell me, is this a blatant case of false advertising, or is it not? Let me know in the comment section below. It's not as if DB is totally innocent in these matters, for they just signed a consent order admitting the manipulation of gold prices. This goes deeper than many may care to admit. Deutsche bank seems to be dumping its gold exposure, and what better way to dump it than to sell it unsuspecting gold derivative note buyers. This is how it could be going down...

Deutsche Bank, through it's Xetra-Gold subsidiary, has a guaranteed, zero premium call option.

1. DB/Xetra-Gold accepts money from investors who are told they are buying gold, from “an economic perspective”.
2. DB/Xetra-Gold takes money that was supposed to buy gold (at least in the eyes of many investors) and does whatever they want with it (which could include buying gold) because gold delivery on demand is not guaranteed and the investors have been disclaimed against ownership of, and rights to, the gold underlying as well as price correlation, and failure to deliver.
3. If the price of gold goes up, DB/Xetra-Gold can fail to deliver (as disclaimed) and keep the capital gains profits. They don't even have to match the price of the gold underlying. or return the initial investment.
4. If the price of gold goes down, DB can deliver gold on demand and keep the spread from gold spot and the price originally charged for the gold notes.

This is good work, if you can get it, no? 

This is how a company like DB can have over 90% in profitable trading days, because they never had a chance of losing in the first place. The losses belong to their clients! This is speculation, of course (wink, wink). Now, legal eagles say that we can't scream fraud, because Deutsche clearly says they have the motivation to, and the ability to, rip you off in their prospectus (but not in their marketing materials).

Which leads us to the end of "The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold", where John Titus (see his videos at the end of this article at the bottom) explained to me after I queried about misleading and contradictory marketing materials:

I asked, "If marketing materials are negatively contradicted by the prospectus then the marketing materials are fraudulent and misrepresentative, no?" He replied...

Hmmm... On that note, let's take a look at whether DB has been a net buyer or net seller of gold exposure. Remember, Goldman, sold MBS structures to clients and then took big short positions betting against their own clients, reference "Goldman 'bet against securities it sold to clients'.

The subcommittee also released four internal Goldman Sachs emails. In one, says a subcommittee statement: "Goldman employees discussed the ups and downs of securities that were underwritten and sold by Goldman and tied to mortgages issued by Washington Mutual Bank's sub-prime lender, Long Beach Mortgage Company. Reporting the 'wipe-out' of one Long Beach security and the 'imminent' collapse of another as 'bad news' that would cost the firm $2.5m, a Goldman Sachs employee then reported the 'good news' – that the failure would bring the firm $5m from a bet it had placed against the very securities it had assembled and sold."

Goldman is fighting to clear its name after the $1bn fraud charges brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission last week, and wants the case settled in court.

The movie, "The Big Short" dramatized this rather well.

Well, guess what it looks like Deustche has been doing...

Deustche has been a net seller of foreign exchange risk, which includes (wait for it now, and guess....) gold! They probably were not cash sellers, but purchased swaps to reduce exposure, possibly along the parameters I mentioned above with the guaranteed, zero premium call option.

If you enjoy this free analysis, there's much more where this came from as we pick apart many other banks in our paid research and knowledge modules. WE just finished a true forensic valuation (very extensive, and detailed analysis) of a very large European bank that led to a huge short recommendation. Subscribe here and pass the word. Our bank analyses have performed very well in 2016, with Banco Popular and Banco Popular Milano doing roughly 40% to 80% in theoretical returns (contingent on how the positions were taken). We have done an excellent job historically as well, calling the fall of Bear Stearns, Lehman, Countrywide, GGP, etc. If you think the free stuff is intense, you should see the stuff that we sell!

 Let me ask you a question. If you were a prospective gold investor, and were not a client of Veritaseum Knowledge, would you buy these gold instruments?

Well, clients of Deustche Bank et. al. certainly did. Reference this story from RT.com: Deutsche Bank refuses clients' demand for physical gold

The website's marketing material is clear enough...

The issuer of Xetra Gold is an entity jointly owned by Germany's Commerzbank & Deutsche Bank (rumored to be merging - Yechh!), among others. Uh Oh!

In the Deutsche Borse Xetra Prospectus under the heading "Key information on the key risks that are specific to the Notes", you will find the following snippet:

Upon acquisition of Notes, an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold and thus bears the market risk associated therewith.

This statement is simply not true, and it's amazing that it passed muster with legal counsel and auditors. Why? Because the following line in the prospectus literally says:

"No correlation with the gold price"

Let's look at this a bit more closely, shall we...

The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold. For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes).

Hmmm... It sounds as if the gold is actually held on the balance sheet of the note issuers. If that's true, then this is not an investment in gold, it's and investment of a derivative of gold exposure and the balance sheet exposure of the issuer. Now, how many of the so-called "investors" of these derivatives got that concept BEFORE they bought in???

Now, you guys (and girls) tell me, do we have reason to suspect credit and solvency issues at the Issuer,'s parent, Deutsche Bank? Let's refer to notes available to subscribers of Veritaseum Knowledge, in particular, the European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation module... 

Actually, DB doesn't think we should concern ourselves with things such as adjustements for credit risks or credit worthiness...

So, with the aforementioned understanding, let's move on through the prospectus...

"The value of a Note will therefore not necessarily equal exactly the value of one gram of Gold at any given time."

"No rights or beneficial ownership in the Gold"

So, let's add these up now...

• ..."an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold", but
  
  • "No correlation with the gold price", and 
  • and "The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold", but
  • "For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes)." - keeping in mind that Deutsche Bank believes 
  • There's no movement in counterparty risks yearly, or cumulatively, due to collateralization (where said collateral is wide open to market forces and valuations) for instruments.

Oh yeah! If I were hired as an expert witness, this stuff could get ugly.... As for now, methinks its time to go put shopping again.

Oh, there's more, for those of you who believed that line "an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold". 

The purchasers of the Notes will only acquire the rights securitised by the Notes. The purchasers of the Notes will not acquire any title to, or security interests or beneficial ownership in, the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer. An investment in the Notes does not constitute a purchase or other acquisition of Gold.

Here's some more risks, this time due to liquidity of the derivatives....

Tradeability No assurance can be given that the admission of the Notes to the regulated market (General Standard) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange will continue or that the Notes will continuously be traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Consequently, there is the risk that sale of the Notes on an exchange may not, or not at all times, be possible.

In reference to actually getting what you're paying not to own...

No control of genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold Neither the Issuer nor the Depositary Agent or any other agent of the Issuer will control the genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer by Clearstream Banking AG in its capacity as Depositary Agent. As the party responsible for all physical delivery processes, Umicore AG & Co. KG will be liable for the genuineness and fineness of the physical Gold acquired by the Issuer with the proceeds from the issue. If the physical Gold which is held in custody by Clearstream Banking AG as Depositary Agent of the Issuer is not genuine or if its fineness does not comply with the requirements specified in the rules adopted by The London Bullion Market Association (or a successor organisation representing market participants in the London gold trading market) for the delivery of gold bars, as amended from time to time and which, at the date of this Prospectus, provide for a minimum fineness of 995 parts per 1000 pure gold, the Notes might only be covered by the aforementioned liability claims against Umicore AG & Co. KG as the party responsible for all physical delivery processes. Market disruptions If the Calculation Agent determines that a market disruption has occurred or continues to exist at any given time, the Issuer will not fulfil its delivery or payment obligations until the Calculation Agent determines that the relevant market disruption has ceased to exist. Any such determination may delay 16 fulfilment by the Issuer of its delivery or payment obligations

Become a member of Veritaseum Knowledge now, and subscribe to the knowledge module European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation. There's much, much, much more to this story than meets the eye. More apparently, there are many more European banks and institutions involved - in countries you'd likely never suspect. We suspect some of them will be going pop in the not too distant future. This is from the team that called Bear Stearns, Lehman, GGP and nearly all of the significant financial institution failures of the 2008 crash.

How can Deutsche Bank destroy the EU? Capital fight and extreme, involuntary deleveraging. DB is closing nearly 200 German bank branches. Not a big deal, right? German bank's depositor base is 111% of German GDP. A run on German banks is literally a run on the German economy - the largest economy in Europe...

...not to mention a major (the major) funding source for DB's massive derivative positions.  

Current news events don't portend a positive outcome for Germany's largest bank either. Bloomberg reports: NordLB Boosts Shipping Provisions Five-Fold, Warns of High Loss

Norddeutsche Landesbank boosted provisions for bad loans nearly fivefold to 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion), as Germany’s biggest shipping lender prepares for its first full-year loss since 2009.

NordLB, controlled by the state of Lower Saxony, posted a loss of 406 million euros in the first half as it battles a prolonged slump in maritime markets, including eight years of crisis in the container segment. That compares with a profit of 290 million euros in the same period last year.

“The shipping crisis, which further intensified in the first half of the year, has necessitated impairments that were higher than planned,” Chief Executive Officer Gunter Dunkel said in a statement. The bank lowered its outlook for the year, now anticipating a “significant” loss. It had projected a “negative result” in the spring.

... NordLB’s pessimistic view highlights risks at other German banks, which hold roughly one-quarter of the about 400 billion euros in global shipping loans. Under pressure to unwind sour legacy maritime assets, banks including HSH Nordbank AG and Commerzbank AG are also trying to shrink their loan books.

 What does this have to do with Deutsche Bank? A lot! Because everybody wants to sell these assets that aren't considered very desirable, and all at the same time, we've made a bad situation worse - precisely when DB can't afford it.

Then there's the issue of DB's somewhat questionable assumptions and characteristics in its financial reporting. Deutsche Bank addendums are quoted as saying:

"The credit risk on the securities purchased under resale agreements and securities borrowed designated under the fair value option is mitigated by the holding of collateral. The valuation of these instruments takes into account the credit enhancement in the form of the collateral received. As such there is no material movement during the year or cumulatively due to movements in counterparty credit risk on these instruments."

What???!!! So, the value of collateral doesn't move now? On planet Earth, not only does the value of collateral move, it tends to move in the exact same direction as the value of the loan, borrowing or underlying, often at an exaggerated pace in the beginning (it's markets are the first to know of turmoil). Reference my podcast interview with Max Keiser at the 2:40 marker. Want some more? Read this page from our EU banking report a couple of quarters ago...

For those who don't believe me, I made this call in early 2008 - twice. Once for Bear Stearns (Is this the Breaking of the Bear?) and once for Lehman Brothers (Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise? Thursday, February 21st, 2008 | Web chatter on Lehman Brothers Sunday, March 16th, 2008). Was I right? Of course, that was then and this is now, so the banks are better prepared, right? Of course. The graphic below was taken from our Banco Popular report (click here for more info), not from 8 years ago, but from a quarter ago - yes, 2016! Hey, there's more...

Now, just imagine that Italy's Banco Popular is the entity that DB used to hedge it's exposure, and Banco Popular (obviously) can't pay up on every(any?)thing. DB's gross exposure become's DB's net exposure as DB's notion value and market value converge near instantaneously if (or when) market shoots off in one direction (you can likely guess what direction that would be for stakeholders, and this time around that includes depositors and bondholders, not just shareholders).

What does this all mean?  Well, we went through this in explicit detail and have identified no less than 6 (and we're still actively looking) financial institutions that may have passed the EBA stress tests, but have miserably failed our examination - and that's without adding in the bank contagion factor!

To partake in this knowledge, join Veritaseum University and purchase the interactive research asset called "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation".

I've worked hard to establish a strong reputation - not only in terms of competence but in terms of integrity. For those who don't know of me, you can view my media apearances and calls as well as my Wikipedia page. You see, my mommy and daddy raised me to appreciate both aspects of success - not only one. With that in mind I'd like to address the recent report from JP Morgan slamming Bitcoin. Just so most know my viewpoint, the typical Bitcoin enthusiast and entrepeneur is primarily technologist leaning, thus may or may not see all of the aspects of the financial side of this new... "thing". In addition, and because of that, the financial guys often get away with some outrageous bullshit that they'd never even try under different circumstances. Let's apply this perspective to JPM's latest FX strategic outlook report, "The Audacity of Bitcoin". I will refute this report, point by point, and in the process make the managing director whose name is on the report look downright ignorant and uneducated. This is not a personal attack or an attempt at sleight (hey, he may be a downright stand-up guy), I am simply calling it as I see it.

Before we get to the report though, I want to address the foolishness of following these "reports" from the big name brand money center banks. Since JP Morgan is the name du jour, let's focus on that one shall we? On Wednesday, 27 April 2011 I penned a piece called There's Something Fishy at the House of Morgan wherein I pointed out quite a few inconsistencies and made an educated extrapolation (my way of saying prediction without having to sound like a guru). One of them was a marked spike in JPM's legal costs, despite a marked drop in the rate of reserving said legal expenses, to wit:

I have warned of this event. JP Morgan (as well as Bank of America) is literally a litigation sinkhole. See JP Morgan Purposely Downplayed Litigation Risk That Spiked 5,000% Last Year & Is Still Severely Under Reserved By Over $4 Billion!!! Shareholder Lawyers Should Be Scrambling Now Wednesday, March 2nd, 2011.

Traditional banking revenues: manifest destiny as forwarned - Weakening Revenue Streams in US Banks Will Make Them More Susceptible To Contingent Risks

 Was I right? Well, here's a list of JP Morgan's fines PAID (yes, paid) over just the last 6 months (this would be $31 billion on an annualized run rate, but whose counting?). Actually, I may be counting - after all you (the taxpayer) paid $30B to bailout Bear Stearns (bought by JP Morgan with US guarantees and financing, remember I warned about Bear Stearns in explicit detail months before the fact- Is this the Breaking of the Bear?) as well as JP Morgan to the tune of at least $12B more. Oh well, back to that list...

1. January 8th Scandals cost JPMorgan $1 billion in fines (various intergovernmental agencies)
2. January 7th: OCC Assesses a $350 Million Civil Money Penalty Against JPM 
3. January 7th UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF THE ... -vs JP Morgan
4. October 16th JPMorgan to Pay $100 Million Fine on CFTC London Whale Claim
5. September 19th SEC.gov | JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits ...
6. September 18 $221 million - UK FCA
7. Septembe 17 $300 million - OCC
8. September 18CFPB Orders Chase and JPMorgan Chase to Pay $309 Million
9. September 18 $60 million - OCC
10. July 30 JP Morgan penalized $285 million for manipulating California electricity prices
11. July 30 JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million in U.S. FERC Settlement - Bloomberg
12. Plus that $13 billion dollar WHOPPER!

This is just the last 6 months!

Go to 12:28 in the video and realize why JP Morgan is a bit more desperate than many believe...

 Better Markets summarizes the past ten years of JP Morgan credibility better than I ever could, as follows: Highlights From A Decade of Illegal Conduct by JP Morgan Chase

1. United States v. JPMorgan Case Bank, NA, No-1:14-cr-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 8, 2014) ($1.7 billion criminal penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-13-109 (Jan. 7, 2014) ($350 million civil penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Dept. of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Admin. Proceeding No. 2014-1 (Jan. 7, 2014) ($461 million civil penalty) (all for violations of law arising from the bank’s role in connection with Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the largest in the history of the U.S.);
2. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC Admin. Proceeding No. 14-01 (Oct. 16, 2013) ($100 million civil penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-15507 (Sept. 19, 2013) ($200 million civil penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., Federal Reserve Board Admin. Proceeding No. 13-031-CMP-HC (Sept. 18, 2013) ($200 million civil penalty); UK Financial Conduct Authority, Final Notice to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Sept. 18, 2013) (£137.6 million ($221 million) penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-2013-75, #2013-140 (Sept. 17, 2013) ($300 million civil penalty) (all for violations of federal law in connection with the proprietary trading losses sustained by JP Morgan Chase in connection with the high risk derivatives bet referred to as the “London Whale”);
3. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB Admin. Proceeding No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Sept. 19, 2013) ($20 million civil penalty and $309 million refund to customers); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-2013-46 (Sept. 18, 2013) ($60 million civil penalty) (both for violations in connection with JP Morgan Chase’s billing practices and fraudulent sale of so-called Identity Protection Products to customers);
4. In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, FERC Admin. Proceeding Nos. IN11-8-000, IN13-5-000 (July 30, 2013) (civil penalty of $285 million and disgorgement of $125 million for energy market manipulation);
5. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 12-cv-1862 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2013) ($301 million in civil penalties and disgorgement for improper conduct related to offerings of mortgage-backed securities);
6. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC Admin. Proceeding No. 12-37 (Sept. 27, 2012) ($600,000 civil penalty for violations of the Commodities Exchange Act relating to trading in excess of position limits);
7. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC Admin. Proceeding No. 12-17 (Apr. 4, 2012) ($20 million civil penalty for the unlawful handling of customer segregated funds relating to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.);
8. United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. 2012) (for foreclosure and mortgage-loan servicing abuses during the Financial Crisis, with JP Morgan Chase paying $5.3 billion in monetary and consumer relief);
9. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., Federal Reserve Board Admin. Proceeding No. 12-009-CMP-HC (Feb. 9, 2012) ($275 million in monetary relief for unsafe and unsound practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing);
10. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 11-cv-03877 (D.N.J. July 7, 2011) ($51.2 million in civil penalties and disgorgement); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., Federal Reserve Board Admin. Proceeding No. 11-081-WA/RB-HC (July 6, 2011) (compliance plan and corrective action requirements); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-11-63 (July 6, 2011)($22 million civil penalty) (all for anticompetitive practices in connection with municipal securities transactions);
11. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC, No. 11-cv-4206 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) ($153.6 million in civil penalties and disgorgement for violations of the securities laws relating to misleading investors in connection with synthetic collateralized debt obligations);
12. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-11-15, #2011-050 (Apr. 13, 2011) (consent order mandating compliance plan and other corrective action resulting from unsafe and unsound mortgage servicing practices);
13. In re J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-13673 (Nov. 4, 2009) ($25 million civil penalty for violations of the securities laws relating to the Jefferson County derivatives trading and bribery scandal);
14. In re JP Morgan Chase & Co, Attorney General of the State of NY Investor Protection Bureau, Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Exec. Law §63(15) (June 2, 2009) ($25 million civil penalty for misrepresenting risks associated with auction rate securities);
15. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-13000 (Mar. 27, 2008) ($1.3 million civil disgorgement for violations of the securities laws relating to JPM’s role as asset-backed indenture trustee to certain special purpose vehicles);
16. In re J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-11828 (Feb. 14, 2005) ($2.1 million in civil fines and penalties for violations of Securities Act record-keeping requirements); and
17. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., 03-cv-2939 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) ($50 million in civil penalties and disgorgements as part of a global settlement for research analyst conflict of interests).

Now, how many bankers went to jail during this entier ten year period? Crickets chirping in the background...

Then there's the actual financial fidelity of the bank itself, which so few call into question... JP Morgan's Derivatives Portfolio Was (and STILL MAY BE) VASTLY Inferior To That of Bear Stearns AND Lehman Brothers Just Before They Collapsed!!!

The oft used chart below was created in the 4th quarter of 2009. I'm sure it's worse now!

So, have I demonstrated the nature of the entity that has issued said report "The Audacity of Bitcoin" and clearly contrasted it to thine humble author (media apearances/calls & Wikipedia page)? This is not a credible institution. The same institution that penned and distributed "The Audacity of Bitcoin" also files patent for Bitcoin-style payment system but JPMorgan's "Bitcoin-Alternative" Patent Was Rejected (175 Times)! 

The Sheer Audacity!

JP Morgan's John Normand says:

"Unlike other asset markets, FX rarely welcomes newcomers for the simple reason that launching a widely-used currency traditionally required creating a sovereign or supra-sovereign entity with a central bank to issue the unit and manage its supply over time.

Hence the audacity of bitcoin: it is a stateless, virtual and peer-to-peer currency, so exists only digitally and is associated with no sovereign, central bank or bank payments system. It is also incredibly illiquid extremely volatile and often caricatured."

Ignorant statement correction #1: Bitcoin is not a currency. It is a bifurcated system consisting of:

1. Bitcoin - an open source peer to peer protocol that enables a fully distributed ledger of data (and not just financial data) that is agreed upon by networked consensus, thus eliminating the need for trust. No fiat currency can come remotely close to doing what it can do;
2. and bitcoin - a stream of data traveling along the fully distributed ledger mentioned above, manifested as a virtual currency that has an inherently native scripting language that fully qualifies it as a smart, programmable currency in stark contrast and direct contravention to "dumb" fiat currencies which have no programmable features whatsoever.

Mr. Normand/JP Morgan also state: "virtual and peer-to-peer currency, so exists only digitally". This patent nonsense. Here is a physical bitcoin right here, compared to two other very popular physical manifestations of digital money:

Mr. Normand and JP Morgan then go on to state: "For corporates, bitcoin’s appeal is two-fold: no or low transaction costs from a peer-to-peer payments system, and the potential brand recognition from trialing a new technology. These advantages must be weighed against extreme illiquidity and volatility, both of which impede risk management. All-in transaction costs may also be higher once the fees from transferring bitcoins to fiat currencies are included."

Well, that's exactly what we're working on at UltraCoin. If you simply do the math you can find out exactly how much using Bitcoin will cost. What JP Morgan forgot to mention was the inherently safe risk management attributes that can come with using UltraCoin over bitcoin. UltraCoin effectively hedges and isolates the user from both credit risk and market risk, if the user is willing to pay the hedging costs. This makes the UltraCoin enabled bitcoin deal multiples safer than doing a similar deal with JP Morgan itself as the counter party. As a reminder, see the two charts above which illustrate JP Morgan's holdings then glance down to the flowchart below.

Tell me, would Greece have been better off dealing with me through UltraCoin and Bitcoin or JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs through their opaque swaps. As a reminder I bring you the BoomBustBlog article I penned a couple of years ago - Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!

The Greeks (again)...

1. 1. According to people familiar with the matter interviewed by China Securities Journal, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. did as many as 12 swaps for Greece from 1998 to 2001, while Credit Suisse was also involved with Athens, crafting a currency swap for Greece in the same time frame.

      Under its "off-market" swap in 2001, Goldman agreed to convert yen and dollars into euros at an artificially favorable rate in the future. This helped Greece to use that "low favorable rate" when it recorded its debt in the European accounts-pushing down the country's reported debt load.

      Moreover, in exchange for the good deal on rates, Greece had to pay Goldman (the amount wasn't revealed). And since the payment would count against Greece's deficit, Goldman and Greece came up with another twist: Goldman effectively loaned Greece the money for the payment, and Greece repaid that loan over time. And the two sides structured the loan as another kind of swap. So, the deal didn't add to Greece's debt under EU rules. Consequently, Greece's total debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 105.3% to 103.7%, and its 2001 deficit was reduced by a tenth of a percentage point in GDP terms, according to people close to Goldman.

      Another action that smacks of Hellenic manipulation, at least to the staff of BoomBustBlog: for years it apparently and simply omitted large portions of its military-equipment spending from its deficit calculations. Though, European regulators eventually prevailed on Greece to count everything and as a result, in 2004, there was a massive revision of Greek deficit figures from 2000 (a budget deficit of 2.0% of GDP in 2000 to beyond the 3% deficit limit in 2004), by then Greece had already gained entrance to the euro. As in my trying to prepare for the coming sovereign debt crisis, timing is everything, isn't it???

You see, these shenanigans are not possible when the swap is implemented with UltraCoin (the derivative layer that we overlay on top of Bitcoin). Remember "Ignorant statement correction #1": Bitcoin is not a currency. It is a bifurcated system consisting of Bitcoin - an open source peer to peer protocol that enables a fully distributed ledger of data (and not just financial data) that is agreed upon by networked consensus, thus eliminating the need for trust. No fiat currency can come remotely close to doing what it can do;...

Because everything is accounted for in the Blockchain, you cannot double count, double deal, lie, cheat, steal or deceivingly overleverage - in other words the typical Wall Street bank business model is fractured!

This means my potential inability to write artciles such as these: Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! or Once You Catch a Few EU Countries “Stretching the Truth”, Why Should You Trust the Rest?

To think, all of this wording... and I'm just getting to the bottom of the first page of this report! If you want me to address the rest, simply give me the heads up in the comment section below - and...

If you want to contribute to the further education of Mr. Normand and JP Morgan, contibute to the UtlraCoin crowdfunding effort here. As you can see from this article, Reggie Middleton's UltraCoin is no mere alternative cryptocurrency. I fully intend to disintermediate the typical Wall Street bank through this technology by elimintating them as the unnecessary, full friction, inefficient and costly (where do you think those $20 million bonuses come from?) middlemen that they are. Remember, THEIR profit margin is MY business model! Click here to crowdfund the disintermediation of Wall Street!

Oh yeah, Mr. Normand, if you ever want to debate Bitcoin in public, I'm game. Let's dance!