Friday, 03 July 2020

A Analysis

I was discussing the US Department of Justice $14B fine levied at Deutsche Bank with my 15 year old son last week. I told him the fine amounted to roughly 70% of Deutsche's market cap, while a similar retroactive tax levy from the EU towards Apple for $14B was about 3% of their cash on hand or a quarter's operating profit.  My son said, "Whoah! Waitaminute! I thought Deutsche Bank was a big company like Apple. Didn't you say that they had trillions of euros of assets on their balance sheet?".

Indeed, I did say such, and he brings up a very valid point that is missed by many a so-called professional. DB is valued at 14.5 billion euros by Mrs Market, yet that amount controlls 1.8 trillion euros worth of assets, and 1.415 trillion after netting and credit adjustments, etc. And to think, some people think a 90 LTV loan is pushing the leverate limiit. Let's take a look at this from a graphica perspective to illustrate just how absurd it is...

Over time, the accounting expression of equity diverges significantly from the markets perception of the bank's equity value.  Somebody is most assuredly mistaken! As of today, DB's books are carrying equity value at 3x that of the stock market. DB market leverage


If one were to use the stock market's equity valuation, one would see that a very, very tiny sliver of equity is controlling nearly 1.5 trillion euro of assets - and that's after the slimming down game is done. Expressed differently, DB is leveaged 97.4x. 

DB market-based leverage Ratio

For those who feel this is an unrealistice way of looking at things, run the same exercise for every failed bank and cross reference the results to that of the European banking regulatory body's methodology of calculating leverage and tell me which methid was (and is) the better predictor of bank failure.

Leverage ratio measures
(In EUR bn., unless stated otherwise) Dec 31, 2014 Mar 31, 2015 Jun 30, 2015 Sep 30, 2015 Dec 31, 2015 Mar 31, 2016 Jun 30, 2016 Sep 28, 2016
Total assets 1,709 1,955 1,694 1,719 1,629 1,741 1,803 1,803
Changes from IFRS to CRR/CRD41 (264) (407) (233) (299) (234) (350)
Derivatives netting1 (562) (668) (480) (508) (460) (523) (556) (556)
Derivatives add-on1 221 227 198 177 166 157 157 157
Written credit derivatives1 65 58 45 42 30 31 24 24
Securities Financing Transactions1 16 20 21 22 25 25 35 35
Off-balance sheet exposure after application of credit conversion factors1 127 134 131 109 109 102 102 102
Consolidation, regulatory and other adjustments1 (131) (177) (148) (140) (104) (140) (151) (151)
CRR/CRD4 leverage exposure measure (spot value at reporting date)1 1,445 1,549 1,461 1,420 1,395 1,390 1,415 1,415
Total equity 73.2 77.9 75.7 68.9 67.6 66.6 66.8 66.8
Market share Price$ 30.0 44.8 30.2 27.0 24.2 16.9 13.7 11.9
Market Cap$ 41.1 61.4 41.3 36.9 33.1 23.2 18.8 16.3
Market Cap EUR 36.6 54.7 36.8 32.9 29.4 20.7 16.7 14.5
Discrspency bet. Accounting & Market-based Equity 50% 30% 51% 52% 56% 69% 75% 78%
Simple, market price derived leverage (Equity/Net Assets) 2.53% 3.53% 2.52% 2.31% 2.11% 1.49% 1.18% 1.03%
Regulatory Accounting (Fully loaded CRR/CRD4 Leverage Ratio in %1) 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Leverge Multiple 39.5x 28.3x 39.7x 43.2x 47.4x 67.3x 84.5x 97.4x
Fully Loaded CRR/CRD4 Tier 1 capital2 50.7 52.5 51.9 51.5 48.7 47.3
Fully loaded CRR/CRD4 Leverage Ratio in %1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4
1 Based on current CRR/CRD 4 rules (including amendments with regard to leverage ratio of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/62 published in the Official Journal of the European Union on January 17, 2015).
2 Regulatory capital amounts, risk weighted assets and capital ratios are based upon CRR/CRD 4 fully-loaded.
Here's my DB warning from 11 and half months ago...
 Our next article will continue to hammer home the liklhood that DB will have to recapitalize, and where they probably WONT'T be getting the money from, as well as the likelihood it will come from someone who really didn't plan on giving it up (Ahem, depositors/savers/checking account holders). For those who are not yet convinced, peruse these related items...

Here's What A Real, Live Veritaseum 5x Short DB Smart Contract Looks Like to Our Research Subscribers 

 If you haven't heard, we're giving out free, fully smart contracts as a 5% rebate to anyone who purchases any of our research packages above the introductory novice $50 level. This is not your Daddy's rebate! The rebate actually gets larger as DB goes down in price. For those who may be coming late to the party, we can offer a 5x long gold (or even a long gold, short DB) smart contract rebate as well. Of course, the bulk of our research targets banks and entities other than DB, but I thought we'd make DB the subject of the rebate to drive the point home. Below is an actual contract crafted off of the price of a single share of DB for about 2 weeks.


The research and knowledge subscription module "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation" contains a full report of a very large European Deutsche Bank counterparty that faces a full 27% downside from current levels. It appears as if no one suspects a clue. It also contains much, much more (including at least 3 to 5 suspect banks). We can break this apart a la carte, if requested.

As excerpted:

Susceptible Bank 1: Financial Modeling

Deutsche Bank is going to need some money, and it's going to need some quite soon. The next two or three articles that I write will focus on why there is such a need. In a concerted effort to reduce or potentially eliminated the risk of taxpayer-funded bailouts of European banks, the EU implemented a new “bail-in” regime beginning on January 1, 2016. As such, new rules require banks and certain systemically significant market participants in EU member states to write-down, cancel, convert into equity or otherwise modify certain unsecured liabilities if such steps are required to recapitalize the institution. What are the most bountiful unsecured liabilities of a bank?

Screenshot 20160922-081728-picsay

Thursday, 25 August 2016 15:01

How Deutsche Bank Can Destroy Europe

How can Deutsche Bank destroy the EU? Capital fight and extreme, involuntary deleveraging. DB is closing nearly 200 German bank branches. Not a big deal, right? German bank's depositor base is 111% of German GDP. A run on German banks is literally a run on the German economy - the largest economy in Europe...

fredgraph 1

...not to mention a major (the major) funding source for DB's massive derivative positions.  

Current news events don't portend a positive outcome for Germany's largest bank either. Bloomberg reports: NordLB Boosts Shipping Provisions Five-Fold, Warns of High Loss

Norddeutsche Landesbank boosted provisions for bad loans nearly fivefold to 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion), as Germany’s biggest shipping lender prepares for its first full-year loss since 2009.

NordLB, controlled by the state of Lower Saxony, posted a loss of 406 million euros in the first half as it battles a prolonged slump in maritime markets, including eight years of crisis in the container segment. That compares with a profit of 290 million euros in the same period last year.

“The shipping crisis, which further intensified in the first half of the year, has necessitated impairments that were higher than planned,” Chief Executive Officer Gunter Dunkel said in a statement. The bank lowered its outlook for the year, now anticipating a “significant” loss. It had projected a “negative result” in the spring.

... NordLB’s pessimistic view highlights risks at other German banks, which hold roughly one-quarter of the about 400 billion euros in global shipping loans. Under pressure to unwind sour legacy maritime assets, banks including HSH Nordbank AG and Commerzbank AG are also trying to shrink their loan books.

 What does this have to do with Deutsche Bank? A lot! Because everybody wants to sell these assets that aren't considered very desirable, and all at the same time, we've made a bad situation worse - precisely when DB can't afford it.DB mass selling bad shiping loans

Then there's the issue of DB's somewhat questionable assumptions and characteristics in its financial reporting. Deutsche Bank addendums are quoted as saying:

"The credit risk on the securities purchased under resale agreements and securities borrowed designated under the fair value option is mitigated by the holding of collateral. The valuation of these instruments takes into account the credit enhancement in the form of the collateral received. As such there is no material movement during the year or cumulatively due to movements in counterparty credit risk on these instruments."

What???!!! So, the value of collateral doesn't move now? On planet Earth, not only does the value of collateral move, it tends to move in the exact same direction as the value of the loan, borrowing or underlying, often at an exaggerated pace in the beginning (it's markets are the first to know of turmoil). Reference my podcast interview with Max Keiser at the 2:40 marker. Want some more? Read this page from our EU banking report a couple of quarters ago...

For those who don't believe me, I made this call in early 2008 - twice. Once for Bear Stearns (Is this the Breaking of the Bear?) and once for Lehman Brothers (Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise? Thursday, February 21st, 2008 | Web chatter on Lehman Brothers Sunday, March 16th, 2008). Was I right? Of course, that was then and this is now, so the banks are better prepared, right? Of course. The graphic below was taken from our Banco Popular report (click here for more info), not from 8 years ago, but from a quarter ago - yes, 2016! Hey, there's more...

Banco Popular Research teaser3

Now, just imagine that Italy's Banco Popular is the entity that DB used to hedge it's exposure, and Banco Popular (obviously) can't pay up on every(any?)thing. DB's gross exposure become's DB's net exposure as DB's notion value and market value converge near instantaneously if (or when) market shoots off in one direction (you can likely guess what direction that would be for stakeholders, and this time around that includes depositors and bondholders, not just shareholders).

What does this all mean?  Well, we went through this in explicit detail and have identified no less than 6 (and we're still actively looking) financial institutions that may have passed the EBA stress tests, but have miserably failed our examination - and that's without adding in the bank contagion factor!

To partake in this knowledge, join Veritaseum University and purchase the interactive research asset called "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation".

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