Friday, 18 October 2019

A Analysis

 If you haven't heard, we're giving out free, fully smart contracts as a 5% rebate to anyone who purchases any of our research packages above the introductory novice $50 level. This is not your Daddy's rebate! The rebate actually gets larger as DB goes down in price. For those who may be coming late to the party, we can offer a 5x long gold (or even a long gold, short DB) smart contract rebate as well. Of course, the bulk of our research targets banks and entities other than DB, but I thought we'd make DB the subject of the rebate to drive the point home. Below is an actual contract crafted off of the price of a single share of DB for about 2 weeks.

Veritaseum 5x Short DB Smart Contract

Click here to explore and subscribe to our research. You will have to be willing to fully identify yourself and comply to the terms or our program (in essence, promise not to use the package for anything other than our rebate) in order to qualify for the rebate. Once the subsciption is paid for, email us to get started.

Oh yeah, if you haven't heard...

An Analysis of Deutsche Bank's Likely Recapitalization - German Tax Payer Bailout or German Bank Depositor Bail-in?

Deutsche Bank is going to need some money, and it's going to need some quite soon. The next two or three articles that I write will focus on why there is such a need. In a concerted effort to reduce or potentially eliminated the risk of taxpayer-funded bail-outs of European banks, the EU implemented a new “bail-in” regime beginning on January 1, 2016. As such, rules which require banks and certain systemically significant market participants in EU member states will have to write-down, cancel, convert into equity or otherwise modify certain unsecured liabilities if such steps are required to recapitalize the institution. What is the most bountiful unsecured liabilities of a bank? Read more...

 

Our next article will continue to hammer home the liklhood that DB will have to recapitalize, and where they probably WONT'T be getting the money from, as well as the likelihood it will come from someone who really didn't plan on giving it up (Ahem, depositors/savers/checking account holders). For those who are not yet convinced, peruse these related items...

The research and knowledge subscription module "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation" contains a full report of a very large European Deutsche Bank counterparty that faces a full 27% downside from current levels. It appears as if no one suspects a clue. It also contains much, much more (including at least 3 to 5 suspect banks). We can break this apart a la carte, if requested.

As excerpted:

Susceptible Bank 1: Financial Modeling

 

Americans are trained to know and to cherish the ideals of democracy and to believe in the American Dream which teaches most Americans that equal opportunity is here for all and that the chances for success for anyone lie within him/herself. None of us are taught to know and understand the American status system which is an important part of our American Dream and often makes the success story a brilliant reality. We all are trained in school to understand democratic ideals and principles and to believe in their fullest expression in American life, but we only learn by hard experience, often damaging to us, that some of the things we learned in early life exist only in our political ideals and are rarely found in the real world. We never learn these things in school, and no teacher teaches us the hard facts of our social-class system, and by extension, our capitalist class system.

We posit that one should study the basic facts of our status system and learn them through systematic, explicit training which will teach at least the adult student much of what he/she needs to know about our status order, how it operates, how he/she fits into the system, and what he/she should do to improve their position or make their present one more tolerable.

The primary drivers of social class mobility (i.e. Less stringent socio-economic stratification) are knowledge and access. Barriers to each of these is what drives socio-economic stratification and stifles social class mobility. For the extreme minority on the top of the socio-economic ladder, it is in their best interest to stifle mobility as much as possible, for mobility only represents:

  1. 1) Downward movement for them, or
  2. 2) Upward movement for those below them.

Any which way one can look at it, mobility, at best, represents displacement and lesser access, less capital, less relative status.

For those who are not members of the very top minority, socio-economic mobility usually means brighter outlooks – as long as said mobility is upward-facing (remember, mobility can be in both directions). As a matter of fact,

The primary products of Veritaseum are knowledge (through our interactively delivered research and opinion) …the lower you move down the socio-economic hierarchy, the more critical and leveraged the shift in socio-economic status becomes.... And access (through our patent-pending blockchain technologies) …

We are, in essence, the socio-economic mobility vendors.

Click here to access the Veritaseum Socioeconomic (Social Class) model... 

This model congeals basic materials about social class in America, identifies the multiple levels, and makes apparent the categories that can facilitate the movement from lower levels to higher ones, and vice versa. Its fundamental goals are to tell the reader (1) how to identify any class level, and (2) how to find the class level of any individual.

Social class enters into almost every aspect of our lives, into marriage, family, business, government, work, and play. It is an important determinant of personality development and is a factor in the kind of skills, abilities, and intelligence an individual uses to solve his problems. Knowledge of what it is and how it works is necessary in working with school records and the files of personnel offices of business and industry. What a woman buys to furnish her house and clothe her family is highly controlled by her social-class values. Keeping up with the Joneses and proving "I'm just as good as anybody else," although fit subjects for the wit of cartoonists because these slogans touch the self-regard of all Americans, are grim expressions of the serious life of most American families. The house they live in, the neighborhood they choose to live in, and the friends they invite to their home, consciously, or more often unconsciously, demonstrate that class values help determine what things we select and what people we choose as our associates.

This model provides a ready and easy means for anyone to equip him or herself with the basic knowledge of socio-economic class so that they can use this type of analysis whenever such factors are important in helping them to know a situation and adjust to it. I have used the model to help predict behavior in the investment real estate market, particularly the residential market in the NYC area where gentrification was rampant. It is now even more apropos, given the significant asset deflation, constriction and selective re-expansion of credit, and considerable shifting of wealth and resources within the US and worldwide.

The businesses of those who make, sell, and advertise merchandise as diverse as houses and women's garments, magazines and motion pictures, or, for that matter, all other mass products and media of communication, are forever at the mercy of the status evaluations of their customers, for their products are not only items of utility for those who buy but powerful symbols of status and social class. This model, and the more detailed and sophisticated one that shall follow, can greatly aid them in measuring and understanding the human beings who make up their markets. Note: This model has been geared towards the NYC Metropolitan area, hence may need to be fine-tuned for dissimilar rural, suburban or non-US areas.

The model has been built upon a modified version of the Index of Status Characteristics (I.S.C.).

 

Social Mobility

 Social class is defined (on this blog) as the amount of control one has over one's socio-economic environment. It is much more than money, although money is a large component. For instance, Barack Obama is in a higher class than Robert DeNiro or Michael Jackson, although Robert DeNiro and Jay-Z are most likely wealthier. Obama's higher class stems from his ability to exert more control over his socio-economic environment. The factors that this author uses to determine class combine (with the associated weights) to create a "socioeconomic index":

Socioeconomic Index=

(Occupation X 12) + (Income source X12) + (Income X 7) + (Wealth X 14) +

(Education X 7) + (Dwelling area X 15) + (Class Consciousness X 7) +

(Housing X 12)

As you can see, wealth is the largest contributor to the class standing, and coincidentally it is the factor that is the most at risk in this current economic climate. I believe that there will be a significant entry into the upper middle class by those who were once firmly entrenched into the upper classes! While that may not seem like a big deal to many, it is damn big deal to those who are moving down the ladder. This also means, that there will be some space for others to move (relatively speaking) up the ladder. One man's (or woman's) misfortune is another's opportunity. I believe this blog can not only be used to insure and proof against downward mobility for those in the upper strata, but can also be used by those in the lower, middle and lower upper strata to rise upward a notch or even two. Social Mobility is the name of the game in times of severe dislocation - times like we will ikely be experiencing soon.

Lower Strata

Underclass/Poor

 
 

Working Poor

 

Middle Strata

Lower Middle Class

 
 

Upper Middle Class

 

Upper Strata

Lower Upper Class

<-- 20% to 30% of Veritaseum users are here, roughly 1,000 of you! We would like to diversify and smooth this out...

 

Higher Upper Class

 

  Now, in term of wealth (not social class and influence, just wealth) we can split the upper strata into three different categories (there are only two above because of the other factors that come into play when social class or socioeconomic standing is taken into consideration). There is the poor wealthy, those guys and girls that are just a hair's breath from being pulled into the upper middle class strata due to marginal wealth. This would be the $1m to $10m net worth crowd, who rely on business profits, salary and investment returns for income. The next would be the middle strata of the wealthy, hailing between $10 t0 $100 million in Net Worth, and then there is the upper strata wealthy at above $100 million. Each of these three strata of wealth represent, in my opinion, distinct behavior tranches in terms of discretionary expenditures, investment, and politics and (what passes as, this is a story for another post) philanthropic activities.  

 

Demographic

Source of wealth

Net Worth

Lower strata wealthy (High net worth)

Service professionals, corporate executives, entrepreneurs, inheritors

Salaries, stock options, restricted stock, small business profits, investment returns

$1 m to $10 m

Middle strata wealthy (Very High Net Worth)

Corporate executives, entrepreneurs, inheritors

Business ownership, investment returns, salaries, restricted stock, stock options

$10 m to $100 m

Upper strata  (the truly Rich!)

Entrepreneurs, inheritors, very few CEOs

Business ownership, investment returns

$100 m to several $billion

A trip to practically any decent sized yacht club or recreational vehicle port reveals the relatively stark differences in discretionary spending behavior. The first strata can be found in the 36 ft. to 68 ft. yacht docks (where a captain is optional, but not mandatory and you really don't need a crew). The second strata can be found 50 ft to 120 ft docks, where captains, crews and semi-custom fiberglass boats abound. The third strata are almost exclusively in the super yacht category, where the carrying cost alone for these (basically waste of money) fully custom built hulls and vehicles are about million a year to start with. You can also see the other social economic strata as well, upper middle class in the 20 to 35 ft boats, the middle and working class in the considerably smaller fishing boats - as opposed to the ultra fast Viking and Hatteras deep sea fishers, etc. It is an interesting and instructional study in social studies and anthropology just walking along your local docks! Once you are aware of how these things break down, you will see many settings in a different light.

Many of those in the higher strata would not be there if they had to compete on a more level playing ground. Alas, elimination of said level playing ground is a goal of those in the upper strata. The problem with that is that such behavior is good for the individual in the upper strata, but bad for society in general for it prevents efficient utilization of human capital. Basically, the best people don't get to do the most things, because they are blocked by those of lesser capability but greater access - access to infrastructure and access to knowledge.

Enter Veritaseum. Our business is to supply said access. We offer knowledge...

Access our knowledge through our proprietary research, analysis and education courses.

We offer access to infrastructure through our gateways to the peer-to-peer capital markets...

If one purchases our research (anything besides the introductory course) we will offer a 5x gold smart contract as a perk. Basically, we will give you a 5% rebate in the form of a Veritaseum smart contract that pays you the price of gold (or a gold index), levered 5x up to a stated maximum. This is a perfect way to both learn and get introduced into the new P2P capital markets and smart contracts.

 

 

 

This is the 4th installment of our public service announcements on Deutsche Bank subsidiary, Xetra-Gold's gold note offerings. Since a lot has been covered already, it's advisable that you read the first 3 articles to catch up:

  1. Veritaseum Knowledge Exposes Frightening Counterparty Risk At Deutsche Bank for "Gold Investors"
  2. Is Deutsche Bank Prepping for Fraud Charges Against It's Gold Derivative Products?
  3. The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold

Now, that we have determined that Deutsche Bank subsidiary Xetra-Gold "may" not have been fraudulent, mainly because they stated in their prospectus things that contradict and befuddle the misleading things they stated in their marketing material, we are left to ponder, "Well, we know the offering was unethical, but was it illegal?" Unfortunately, I'm not a lawyer thus cannot accurately opine on such. Alas, I can speculate as a laymen. The Xetra-Gold derivatives were offered in the UK, as well as several other jurisdictions. Let's peruse the UK perspective via the FCA in the difference between clear and misleading financial advertising:

"Financial adverts and promotions can be misleading for many reasons, but there are some questions you can consider to help you spot and avoid misleading financial adverts, such as: ... Are there important points that are only shown in the small print?"

Hmm... Let's take a look at the Xetra-Gold advertisement, and cross reference it to it's prospectus:

DB Xetra-Gold false advertising test

You guys tell me, is this a blatant case of false advertising, or is it not? Let me know in the comment section below. It's not as if DB is totally innocent in these matters, for they just signed a consent order admitting the manipulation of gold prices. This goes deeper than many may care to admit. Deutsche bank seems to be dumping its gold exposure, and what better way to dump it than to sell it unsuspecting gold derivative note buyers. This is how it could be going down...

Deutsche Bank, through it's Xetra-Gold subsidiary, has a guaranteed, zero premium call option.

  1. DB/Xetra-Gold accepts money from investors who are told they are buying gold, from “an economic perspective”.
  2. DB/Xetra-Gold takes money that was supposed to buy gold (at least in the eyes of many investors) and does whatever they want with it (which could include buying gold) because gold delivery on demand is not guaranteed and the investors have been disclaimed against ownership of, and rights to, the gold underlying as well as price correlation, and failure to deliver.
  3. If the price of gold goes up, DB/Xetra-Gold can fail to deliver (as disclaimed) and keep the capital gains profits. They don't even have to match the price of the gold underlying. or return the initial investment.
  4. If the price of gold goes down, DB can deliver gold on demand and keep the spread from gold spot and the price originally charged for the gold notes.

This is good work, if you can get it, no? 

This is how a company like DB can have over 90% in profitable trading days, because they never had a chance of losing in the first place. The losses belong to their clients! This is speculation, of course (wink, wink). Now, legal eagles say that we can't scream fraud, because Deutsche clearly says they have the motivation to, and the ability to, rip you off in their prospectus (but not in their marketing materials).

DB

Which leads us to the end of "The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold", where John Titus (see his videos at the end of this article at the bottom) explained to me after I queried about misleading and contradictory marketing materials:

I asked, "If marketing materials are negatively contradicted by the prospectus then the marketing materials are fraudulent and misrepresentative, no?" He replied...

Misrepresentative, yes (accepting your definition of economic), and the marketing materials probably do in fact flout any number of laws against false advertising.
 
But fraudulent, no. The essence of fraud is to falsely induce someone by words or acts into doing something against his interests that he wouldn't have done but for the dishonesty. Courts consider the totality of the circumstances. So while you would undoubtedly tear the economic investment statement to shreds, you'd still be left with the many other statements from the prospectus that are true, and herein lies the problem.
 
The UK Fraud Act of 2006 is a criminal statute. So each element of the crime has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (or whatever the English equivalent burden of proof is). The first element of fraud by false representation under the Act is "dishonestly makes a false representation." The problem posed by the prospectus is that it would preclude a finding that DB acted dishonestly beyond a reasonable doubt. I mean, you've got one false (but arguably vague) statement vs. several clear-cut disclaimers that are accurate. The totality of the statements are perhaps half false and half true, but dishonest beyond a reasonable doubt? Fuhgetaboutit. DB played the game with all of its cards face up. Yeah, they contradicted each other, but they were damn sure visible to investors, who can claim they were misled only in a subjective (personal) sense, not in an objective way (which is how a judge would look at it).
 
Now, if--in addition to the mktg mat's and the prospectus--you've got some Goldman-like behavior where DB took out massive insurance policies on the investments it sold and concealed them from the buyer, it's a totally different story."

Hmmm... On that note, let's take a look at whether DB has been a net buyer or net seller of gold exposure. Remember, Goldman, sold MBS structures to clients and then took big short positions betting against their own clients, reference "Goldman 'bet against securities it sold to clients'.

The subcommittee also released four internal Goldman Sachs emails. In one, says a subcommittee statement: "Goldman employees discussed the ups and downs of securities that were underwritten and sold by Goldman and tied to mortgages issued by Washington Mutual Bank's sub-prime lender, Long Beach Mortgage Company. Reporting the 'wipe-out' of one Long Beach security and the 'imminent' collapse of another as 'bad news' that would cost the firm $2.5m, a Goldman Sachs employee then reported the 'good news' – that the failure would bring the firm $5m from a bet it had placed against the very securities it had assembled and sold."

Goldman is fighting to clear its name after the $1bn fraud charges brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission last week, and wants the case settled in court.

The movie, "The Big Short" dramatized this rather well.

Well, guess what it looks like Deustche has been doing...

DB gold exposure expressed as VaRDeustche has been a net seller of foreign exchange risk, which includes (wait for it now, and guess....) gold! They probably were not cash sellers, but purchased swaps to reduce exposure, possibly along the parameters I mentioned above with the guaranteed, zero premium call option.

If you enjoy this free analysis, there's much more where this came from as we pick apart many other banks in our paid research and knowledge modules. WE just finished a true forensic valuation (very extensive, and detailed analysis) of a very large European bank that led to a huge short recommendation. Subscribe here and pass the word. Our bank analyses have performed very well in 2016, with Banco Popular and Banco Popular Milano doing roughly 40% to 80% in theoretical returns (contingent on how the positions were taken). We have done an excellent job historically as well, calling the fall of Bear Stearns, Lehman, Countrywide, GGP, etc. If you think the free stuff is intense, you should see the stuff that we sell!

The Wall Street Journal has a well done analysis of Greek debt coming due in about a week. It's a lot considering the size of the country's shrinking economy! Here's a snapshot:

Greek Debt Due from WSJ

I have explained the Greek situation in full detail for my blog subscribers back in 2010, 2011 and 2012.

For background and perspective, read Lies, Damn Lies and the EU Confiscation Of Greek Sovereignty Masked As The Bailout That Never Happened. Pay close attention to these parts...

image022

image021 copy

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 So, as I was saying...

 It just won't work because it doesn't solve the problem. Instead, it attempts to conceal the problem in fashion that pretends it never existed. Let's walk through this so a 5 year old can understand it.

image062
Interestingly enough, Reinhart and Rogoff, of This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Follyfame contend "that historically, significant waves of increased capital mobility are often followed by a string of domestic banking crises". If that is actually the case, then the very goal of the Euro project was bound to bring about a sting of banking crises and all of this was actually inevitable. As excerpted:

image037

The forgotten history of domestic debt has important lessons for the present. As we have already noted, most investment banks, not to mention official bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have argued that even though total public debt remains quite high today (early 2008) in many emerging markets, the risk of
default on external debt has dropped dramatically, especially as the share of external debt has fallen. This conclusion seems to be built on the faulty premise that countries will treat domestic debt as junior, bullying domestics into accepting lower repayments or simply 12 defaulting via inflation. The historical record, however, suggests that a high ratio of domestic to external debt in overall public debt is cold comfort to external debt holders.

Default probabilities probably depend much more on the overall level of debt. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) discuss the interesting example of India, who in 1958 rescheduled its
foreign debts when it stood at only1/4 percent of revenues. The sums were so minor that the event did not draw great attention in the Western press. The explanation, as it turns out, is that India at this time had a significant claim on revenue from the service of domestic debt (in effect the total debt-to revenue ratio was 4.4. To summarize, many investors appear to be justifying still relatively low external debt credit spreads because “This time is different” and emerging market governments are now relying more on domestic public debt. If so, they are deeply mistaken.

media-wpmu-uploads-blogs.dir-1-files-2011-05-image0032-300x400

... and this part from Saturday, 23 July 2011 The Anatomy Of A European Bank Run: Look At The Banking Situation BEFORE The Run Occurs!: I detail how I see modern bank runs unfolding

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Now, with a full background on how we got to where we are now we move over to Goldman's recommended defensive plays to a Grexit, as reported by ZeroHedge. Before we go on, remember my admonitions about blindly following Goldman's retail and institutional analyst recommenations:

    • If tensions turn systemic, EM assets likely to see pressure

Even as Greek concerns have escalated, risk markets have so far traded in a resilient fashion, treating those concerns as effectively isolated to Greek assets. But in previous episodes of acute Euro area stress in 2010 and 2012, a wide range of EM assets came under pressure, especially CEE FX and CDS. Hungary was the hardest hit across all asset classes.
 

    • To hedge Greek risk, long $/CEE

Among EM, $/CEE has seen the largest moves in times of Euro area stress. This has reflected a weakening EUR and EUR/CEE moving higher. Specifically, the HUF and PLN are likely to depreciate against the USD in the medium term as policymakers welcome weaker currencies in the fight against ‘lowflation’, and would move even more rapidly if Greek risks do become systemic. Locally, the entry levels are also attractive given the rally in EUR/CEE in recent weeks.

*  *  *

Hedging Greek risks in EM assets

Euro area sovereign and financial risks rising again
The nearly constant barrage of headlines reporting comments from Greek and Euro area policymakers is indicative of the renewed deterioration in sovereign risk. Greece and its Euro area counterparties continue to work within a tight schedule to avert a disorderly outcome. Our base case remains that some new accommodation will eventually be found between Greece and the European authorities. But risks of an accident remain as commercial bank deposit outflow and a shortfall in tax collections can precipitate a critical situation in the interim. Even if an agreement to extend the programme is reached this week, the gap between the demands of the Greek side and the actual programme requirements is very large.

The situation is fluid, and if an agreement is reached quickly to extend the Greek bailout, then broader asset markets (including in EM) should stay largely unaffected. But we continue to receive questions on how EM investors can consider hedging the risks of a more messy outcome – that either leads to a ‘no man’s land’ where Greece is without the funding that comes along with a programme or, in the worst case, an outright exit from the common currency. In these latter outcomes, with systemic risk likely to increase, EM assets would come under pressure.

Three weeks ago, we described how in previous episodes of Euro area turmoil, on average EM bond yields tracked the move lower in G3 yields as demand for safe assets spiked, whereas EM credit spreads widened, EM FX weakened versus the USD and EM equities came under broad pressure (see ‘Taking one step back’, EM Weekly: 15/03, January 29, 2015). That said, both EM and G3 bond yields are now at much lower levels – which makes the argument for being long EM fixed income more debatable in the current context. In this EM Weekly, we drill further down within EM FX, CDS and equities to evaluate the relative performance across countries over those previous episodes to help identify how best to protect portfolios against an escalation in Greek risks.

The EM asset experience in the 2010 and 2012 episodes of Euro area stress
Even as concerns around the extension of the Greek programme have escalated, risk markets have so far traded in a resilient fashion, treating those concerns as effectively isolated to Greek assets. But in previous episodes of acute Euro area stress, a wide range of EM assets came under pressure as risk traded poorly. Below we study the two previous episodes of Euro area stress in 2010 and 2012 to assess how different EM assets were affected on average. Euro area stresses were also elevated in 2011, but in that episode it is harder to distinguish between the impact of the Euro area worries and the US debt-ceiling crisis, which played a major role in roiling markets.

Starting with EM FX, Exhibits 3 and 4 show the average moves versus the USD and the EUR over the two periods when Euro area stresses were at their most acute: mid-April to early June 2010 and mid-March to early June 2012. Exhibit 3 shows that in these ‘risk-off’ periods, almost all EM currencies depreciated versus the USD. In relative terms, the largest average depreciations were recorded in the Central and Eastern European region (PLN, HUF, CZK), followed by a couple of the high-yielders (RUB, ZAR) in the European time-zone. The MXN and BRL were most affected in the LatAm region, whereas NJA currencies outperformed.

Most EM currencies appreciated versus the EUR (Exhibit 4), which is unsurprising given that the Euro area was the epicentre of the shocks at these times. But, notably, the CEE-4 currencies saw meaningful depreciations versus the EUR, even as the EUR itself was depreciating. The geographical proximity and the strong trade and financial linkages of the CEE region to the Euro area meant that currencies there have tended to bear the brunt of Euro area crisis episodes.

 

Goldman believes Hungary is the most susceptible to Grexit risks. Since I've only excerpted the analysis, you can get the full story from the ZeroHedge article direcly... 

$/HUF and $/PLN weakening our preferred ways to hedge Greek risks
At the current juncture the market appears to be making a couple of assumptions: first, that the ongoing disagreements between the Greek government and the Eurogroup represents the typical political posturing that has tended to take place in advance of eventual eleventh hour agreements; and, second, that in the event that agreement cannot be reached by the end of February, the upgraded EU toolkit, including the OMT and the soon-to-be-initiated sovereign QE, will keep market pressures from spilling over into the rest of the EU periphery, and by extension into the broader market.

Our read of the situation is less sanguine on both counts. An eventual agreement between the Greek government and the Eurogroup is still our base case, but we worry that the gap between the current programme on offer and what would be acceptable to a majority of the Greek parliament is very large. In addition, market pressure has often been the forcing variable in the past in helping to close this gap, so paradoxically the absence of broader market pressure is likely to make an eventual agreement that much less likely. In the event that an agreement cannot be found, and ‘Grexit’ becomes a serious possibility, we would expect systemic concerns to affect markets more broadly than currently. As Francesco Garzarelli discussed (in Global Markets Views: ‘Systemic risks posed by Greece set to peak at month-end’, February 17, 2015), even if peripheral bonds are shielded from the fallout by the ECB’s purchases, we would expect the EUR and stocks to come under downward pressure, and credit spreads to widen, reflecting the downside risks to a fragile economic recovery in the Euro area.

Given the results documented in the previous section, our preferred way to hedge these risks would be through long $/CEE positions. In previous episodes of Euro area stress, the combination of the EUR moving lower versus the USD and EUR/CEE moving higher has meant that $/CEE has tended to see the largest moves across the EM FX complex. Even setting aside Greece-related risks, our forecasts call for EUR/USD to move to 1.11, EUR/PLN to weaken to 4.22 and EUR/HUF to weaken to 320 in 6 months, as policymakers in these economies welcome or actively seek weaker currencies in their fight against ‘lowflation’. This implies that the HUF and PLN are likely to weaken against the USD in the medium term based on macro and policy considerations, and if Greece-related risks turn systemic, the weakening is likely to be even more rapid. Finally, given the rally in EUR/HUF and EUR/PLN over the past three weeks, locally the entry levels are also much more attractive.

I've excluded the portions relating to CDS, but the EM FX is more than what's needed. I'm fully aware that CDS trades and exotic forext pairs may be beyond the ken of most retail investors and likely many institutional investors as well (which is why banks get them into such precarious situations, that cost them so much to get out of, ie. How Veritaseum's UltraCoin Could Have Saved Harvard Over $1 Billion!). Alas, I digress. Those who follow me know that I clearly aim to disintermediate rent seeking in the financial space and to return said rents back to the community at large in order to let true talent, intellect, and most importantly drive (the prime determinent of success absent institutional barriers to entry, participation and geo/socioeconomic discrimination). These tweets make a good segway into how and why consumers - big and small (like Harvard who was taken advantage of by the Bank Morgans and stay at home day traders) - can now compete with Wall Street and stand toe to toe. 

Now, I will work the magic of technology and show everyone who can make it to the bottom of this article (unfortunately, that is truly only a select few) how to encapsulae the Goldman researh (which I haven't personally vetted, but does make sense on its face) in one single trade. This trade, a digital swap, is something that Goldman itself, nor any of its competitors (save Veritasuem, which is a software concern and not a financial institution) can offer you. Goldman suggests "$/HUF and $/PLN weakening our preferred ways to hedge Greek risks". A cursory look at these two pairs through both the 2012 scare and now lends credence to the Goldman assumption.

Grexit Hedge using Dual CEE Forex pairs

 So, let's take a position on both pairs with a single UltraCoin swap. This can be be modeled with Veritaseum's UltraCoin Trade Modelling Spreadsheet before actually being entered through the actual ultracoin client. Keep in mind that, as a digital derivative transaction:

  1. You can take as small or as large a position as you please. This example uses a $4000 at risk amount, you can use as little as 12 cents or as much as $300 million.
  2. The use of leverage can give you extreme buying power (up to 10,000x), but along with it is extreme risk and larger fees. At the end of the day, its still beats ANYTHING Goldman can, or would offer you. Here we have the equivalent of two forex pair swaps for $100,000 for $121. Read  How Veritaseum's UltraCoin Could Have Saved Harvard Over $1 Billion! to see how much JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley charged Harvard. Here's a spoiler, it was more than the 10 basis points they would have been charged with UltraCoin!
  3. This is a very custom swap. I'm not saying Goldman can't do it, but it's not just sitting around in their inventory, and they will charge you accordingly - with no more liquidity than is offered here, but with a LOT less transparency and safety. As a matter of fact, you always either no where your money is (in the blockchain) or have it in your possession (via your wallet), that is unless you lose it. Here's a graphic of the order placed, and to find the location of your funds at any time, just hit that "Track Transactions" button at the bottom.

Grexit Hedge using Dual CEE Forex pair UltraCoin Swap order placed

    Rest assured, Goldman, et. al. can never tell you where your funds are at any specific time. The ex-president of Goldman, Mssr. Corzine can attest that Man Financial probably couldn't either, as per Wikipedia:
    1. In 2011, MF Global faced major pressures to its liquidity over several months. Some analysts and financial commentators indicate that MF Global probably experienced a number of trading days in 2011 during which the firm's bets on sovereign debt would have required the use of customer funds to meet capital requirements, thereby maintaining operating funds and possibly overall solvency. A large part of these pressures on MF Global were a result of the firm's involvement in a significant number ofrepurchase agreements. Many of these repo agreements were conducted off their balance sheet. Also, MF Global made a $6.3 billion investment on its own behalf in bonds of some of Europe’s most indebted nations. Failure of those, and other, repo positions contributed to the massive liquidity crisis at the firm.
  1. UltraCoin is P2P software, not a brokerage firm or a bank hence there is absolutely no exposure to our balance sheet or the risks of such that my ensue. It never, at any time, even takes possession nor has control of any of your funds, thus it can never abscond with them or use them in an inappropriate manner.
  2. The only other possible (okay, credible) sales objection the Goldman team could raise to prevent their clients from defecting to a software solution as compared to their 45% of gross revenues paid as their compensation solution is that the Veritaseum solution rides on the Bitcoin blockchain, exposing users to BTC volatility. Outside of the fact Goldman would likely charge you more for the swap than the volatiity may cost you, I have modeled in a 10% drop in BTC prices, along with all the fees charged to show you what happens when the swap is constructed properly. Just follow the series of graphics below carefully and read everything.

 Grexit Hedge using Dual CEE Forex pair UltraCoin Swap

I love to talk! I'm willing to discuss anything in this article, from Grexit to Wall Street banks to the technology that challenges their hegemony, with anyone. Just reach out to me here.

In the 2008 to 2013 period, Harvard suffered huge losses due to their exposure to interest rate swaps which were used to swap floating for fixed interest rates. Things went downhill when the rates started to collapse and Harvard received a massive margin call on the swaps.

To limit its exposure to the interest rate swaps, Harvard took offsetting swaps, paying a huge premium to the other party. Harvard’s total losses look something like this…

Loss to Harvard = Loss of value of extant interest rate swaps + Premium of Offsetting Swaps + Penalty / charges          payable to the swap issuing entities (JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley)

harvard swap diagram

Our downloadable report illustrates how Veritaseum's UltraCoin peer to peer swap technology could have easily saved Harvard a bundle relative to what JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley charged them. Below is an excerpt from the full report, which is available for free download here.

UltraCoin Couldve Saved Harvard Over A 1 Billion

I've worked hard to establish a strong reputation - not only in terms of competence but in terms of integrity. For those who don't know of me, you can view my media apearances and calls as well as my Wikipedia page. You see, my mommy and daddy raised me to appreciate both aspects of success - not only one. With that in mind I'd like to address the recent report from JP Morgan slamming Bitcoin. Just so most know my viewpoint, the typical Bitcoin enthusiast and entrepeneur is primarily technologist leaning, thus may or may not see all of the aspects of the financial side of this new... "thing". In addition, and because of that, the financial guys often get away with some outrageous bullshit that they'd never even try under different circumstances. Let's apply this perspective to JPM's latest FX strategic outlook report, "The Audacity of Bitcoin". I will refute this report, point by point, and in the process make the managing director whose name is on the report look downright ignorant and uneducated. This is not a personal attack or an attempt at sleight (hey, he may be a downright stand-up guy), I am simply calling it as I see it.

Before we get to the report though, I want to address the foolishness of following these "reports" from the big name brand money center banks. Since JP Morgan is the name du jour, let's focus on that one shall we? On Wednesday, 27 April 2011 I penned a piece called There's Something Fishy at the House of Morgan wherein I pointed out quite a few inconsistencies and made an educated extrapolation (my way of saying prediction without having to sound like a guruConfused). One of them was a marked spike in JPM's legal costs, despite a marked drop in the rate of reserving said legal expenses, to wit:

 


I have warned of this event. JP Morgan (as well as Bank of America) is literally a litigation sinkhole. See JP Morgan Purposely Downplayed Litigation Risk That Spiked 5,000% Last Year & Is Still Severely Under Reserved By Over $4 Billion!!! Shareholder Lawyers Should Be Scrambling Now Wednesday, March 2nd, 2011.

Traditional banking revenues: manifest destiny as forwarned - Weakening Revenue Streams in US Banks Will Make Them More Susceptible To Contingent Risks

 Was I right? Well, here's a list of JP Morgan's fines PAID (yes, paid) over just the last 6 months (this would be $31 billion on an annualized run rate, but whose counting?). Actually, I may be counting - after all you (the taxpayer) paid $30B to bailout Bear Stearns (bought by JP Morgan with US guarantees and financing, remember I warned about Bear Stearns in explicit detail months before the fact- Is this the Breaking of the Bear?) as well as JP Morgan to the tune of at least $12B more. Oh well, back to that list...

  1. January 8th Scandals cost JPMorgan $1 billion in fines (various intergovernmental agencies)
  2. January 7th: OCC Assesses a $350 Million Civil Money Penalty Against JPM 
  3. January 7th UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF THE ... -vs JP Morgan
  4. October 16th JPMorgan to Pay $100 Million Fine on CFTC London Whale Claim
  5. September 19th SEC.gov | JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits ...
  6. September 18 $221 million - UK FCA
  7. Septembe 17 $300 million - OCC
  8. September 18CFPB Orders Chase and JPMorgan Chase to Pay $309 Million
  9. September 18 $60 million - OCC
  10. July 30 JP Morgan penalized $285 million for manipulating California electricity prices
  11. July 30 JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million in U.S. FERC Settlement - Bloomberg
  12. Plus that $13 billion dollar WHOPPER!

This is just the last 6 months!

Go to 12:28 in the video and realize why JP Morgan is a bit more desperate than many believe...

 Better Markets summarizes the past ten years of JP Morgan credibility better than I ever could, as follows: Highlights From A Decade of Illegal Conduct by JP Morgan Chase

  1. United States v. JPMorgan Case Bank, NA, No-1:14-cr-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 8, 2014) ($1.7 billion criminal penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-13-109 (Jan. 7, 2014) ($350 million civil penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Dept. of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Admin. Proceeding No. 2014-1 (Jan. 7, 2014) ($461 million civil penalty) (all for violations of law arising from the bank’s role in connection with Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the largest in the history of the U.S.);
  2. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC Admin. Proceeding No. 14-01 (Oct. 16, 2013) ($100 million civil penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-15507 (Sept. 19, 2013) ($200 million civil penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., Federal Reserve Board Admin. Proceeding No. 13-031-CMP-HC (Sept. 18, 2013) ($200 million civil penalty); UK Financial Conduct Authority, Final Notice to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Sept. 18, 2013) (£137.6 million ($221 million) penalty); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-2013-75, #2013-140 (Sept. 17, 2013) ($300 million civil penalty) (all for violations of federal law in connection with the proprietary trading losses sustained by JP Morgan Chase in connection with the high risk derivatives bet referred to as the “London Whale”);
  3. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB Admin. Proceeding No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Sept. 19, 2013) ($20 million civil penalty and $309 million refund to customers); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-2013-46 (Sept. 18, 2013) ($60 million civil penalty) (both for violations in connection with JP Morgan Chase’s billing practices and fraudulent sale of so-called Identity Protection Products to customers);
  4. In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, FERC Admin. Proceeding Nos. IN11-8-000, IN13-5-000 (July 30, 2013) (civil penalty of $285 million and disgorgement of $125 million for energy market manipulation);
  5. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 12-cv-1862 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2013) ($301 million in civil penalties and disgorgement for improper conduct related to offerings of mortgage-backed securities);
  6. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC Admin. Proceeding No. 12-37 (Sept. 27, 2012) ($600,000 civil penalty for violations of the Commodities Exchange Act relating to trading in excess of position limits);
  7. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC Admin. Proceeding No. 12-17 (Apr. 4, 2012) ($20 million civil penalty for the unlawful handling of customer segregated funds relating to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.);
  8. United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. 2012) (for foreclosure and mortgage-loan servicing abuses during the Financial Crisis, with JP Morgan Chase paying $5.3 billion in monetary and consumer relief);
  9. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., Federal Reserve Board Admin. Proceeding No. 12-009-CMP-HC (Feb. 9, 2012) ($275 million in monetary relief for unsafe and unsound practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing);
  10. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 11-cv-03877 (D.N.J. July 7, 2011) ($51.2 million in civil penalties and disgorgement); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., Federal Reserve Board Admin. Proceeding No. 11-081-WA/RB-HC (July 6, 2011) (compliance plan and corrective action requirements); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-11-63 (July 6, 2011)($22 million civil penalty) (all for anticompetitive practices in connection with municipal securities transactions);
  11. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC, No. 11-cv-4206 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) ($153.6 million in civil penalties and disgorgement for violations of the securities laws relating to misleading investors in connection with synthetic collateralized debt obligations);
  12. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., OCC Admin. Proceeding No. AA-EC-11-15, #2011-050 (Apr. 13, 2011) (consent order mandating compliance plan and other corrective action resulting from unsafe and unsound mortgage servicing practices);
  13. In re J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-13673 (Nov. 4, 2009) ($25 million civil penalty for violations of the securities laws relating to the Jefferson County derivatives trading and bribery scandal);
  14. In re JP Morgan Chase & Co, Attorney General of the State of NY Investor Protection Bureau, Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Exec. Law §63(15) (June 2, 2009) ($25 million civil penalty for misrepresenting risks associated with auction rate securities);
  15. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-13000 (Mar. 27, 2008) ($1.3 million civil disgorgement for violations of the securities laws relating to JPM’s role as asset-backed indenture trustee to certain special purpose vehicles);
  16. In re J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-11828 (Feb. 14, 2005) ($2.1 million in civil fines and penalties for violations of Securities Act record-keeping requirements); and
  17. SEC v. J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., 03-cv-2939 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) ($50 million in civil penalties and disgorgements as part of a global settlement for research analyst conflict of interests).

Now, how many bankers went to jail during this entier ten year period?

Then there's the actual financial fidelity of the bank itself, which so few call into question... JP Morgan's Derivatives Portfolio Was (and STILL MAY BE) VASTLY Inferior To That of Bear Stearns AND Lehman Brothers Just Before They Collapsed!!!


JPM Lower Grade Derivatives

The oft used chart below was created in the 4th quarter of 2009. I'm sure it's worse now!

JP Morgan's Chart

So, have I demonstrated the nature of the entity that has issued said report "The Audacity of Bitcoin" and clearly contrasted it to thine humble author (media apearances/calls & Wikipedia page)? This is not a credible institution. The same institution that penned and distributed "The Audacity of Bitcoin" also files patent for Bitcoin-style payment system but JPMorgan's "Bitcoin-Alternative" Patent Was Rejected (175 Times)

The Sheer Audacity!

JPM Audacity of Bitcoin pg 1

JP Morgan's John Normand says:

"Unlike other asset markets, FX rarely welcomes newcomers for the simple reason that launching a widely-used currency traditionally required creating a sovereign or supra-sovereign entity with a central bank to issue the unit and manage its supply over time.

Hence the audacity of bitcoin: it is a stateless, virtual and peer-to-peer currency, so exists only digitally and is associated with no sovereign, central bank or bank payments system. It is also incredibly illiquid extremely volatile and often caricatured."

Ignorant statement correction #1: Bitcoin is not a currency. It is a bifurcated system consisting of:

  1. Bitcoin - an open source peer to peer protocol that enables a fully distributed ledger of data (and not just financial data) that is agreed upon by networked consensus, thus eliminating the need for trust. No fiat currency can come remotely close to doing what it can do;
  2. and bitcoin - a stream of data traveling along the fully distributed ledger mentioned above, manifested as a virtual currency that has an inherently native scripting language that fully qualifies it as a smart, programmable currency in stark contrast and direct contravention to "dumb" fiat currencies which have no programmable features whatsoever.

Mr. Normand/JP Morgan also state: "virtual and peer-to-peer currency, so exists only digitally". This patent nonsense. Here is a physical bitcoin right here, compared to two other very popular physical manifestations of digital money:

digital currencies

Mr. Normand and JP Morgan then go on to state: "For corporates, bitcoin’s appeal is two-fold: no or low transaction costs from a peer-to-peer payments system, and the potential brand recognition from trialing a new technology. These advantages must be weighed against extreme illiquidity and volatility, both of which impede risk management. All-in transaction costs may also be higher once the fees from transferring bitcoins to fiat currencies are included."

Well, that's exactly what we're working on at UltraCoin. If you simply do the math you can find out exactly how much using Bitcoin will cost. What JP Morgan forgot to mention was the inherently safe risk management attributes that can come with using UltraCoin over bitcoin. UltraCoin effectively hedges and isolates the user from both credit risk and market risk, if the user is willing to pay the hedging costs. This makes the UltraCoin enabled bitcoin deal multiples safer than doing a similar deal with JP Morgan itself as the counter party. As a reminder, see the two charts above which illustrate JP Morgan's holdings then glance down to the flowchart below.

BTC swap  conversion cost flowchart1

Tell me, would Greece have been better off dealing with me through UltraCoin and Bitcoin or JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs through their opaque swaps. As a reminder I bring you the BoomBustBlog article I penned a couple of years ago - Smoking Swap Guns Are Beginning to Litter EuroLand, Sovereign Debt Buyer Beware!

The Greeks (again)...

    1. According to people familiar with the matter interviewed by China Securities Journal, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. did as many as 12 swaps for Greece from 1998 to 2001, while Credit Suisse was also involved with Athens, crafting a currency swap for Greece in the same time frame.

        Under its "off-market" swap in 2001, Goldman agreed to convert yen and dollars into euros at an artificially favorable rate in the future. This helped Greece to use that "low favorable rate" when it recorded its debt in the European accounts-pushing down the country's reported debt load.

      Moreover, in exchange for the good deal on rates, Greece had to pay Goldman (the amount wasn't revealed). And since the payment would count against Greece's deficit, Goldman and Greece came up with another twist: Goldman effectively loaned Greece the money for the payment, and Greece repaid that loan over time. And the two sides structured the loan as another kind of swap. So, the deal didn't add to Greece's debt under EU rules. Consequently, Greece's total debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 105.3% to 103.7%, and its 2001 deficit was reduced by a tenth of a percentage point in GDP terms, according to people close to Goldman.

      Another action that smacks of Hellenic manipulation, at least to the staff of BoomBustBlog: for years it apparently and simply omitted large portions of its military-equipment spending from its deficit calculations. Though, European regulators eventually prevailed on Greece to count everything and as a result, in 2004, there was a massive revision of Greek deficit figures from 2000 (a budget deficit of 2.0% of GDP in 2000 to beyond the 3% deficit limit in 2004), by then Greece had already gained entrance to the euro. As in my trying to prepare for the coming sovereign debt crisis, timing is everything, isn't it???

You see, these shenanigans are not possible when the swap is implemented with UltraCoin (the derivative layer that we overlay on top of Bitcoin). Remember "Ignorant statement correction #1": Bitcoin is not a currency. It is a bifurcated system consisting of Bitcoin - an open source peer to peer protocol that enables a fully distributed ledger of data (and not just financial data) that is agreed upon by networked consensus, thus eliminating the need for trust. No fiat currency can come remotely close to doing what it can do;...

Because everything is accounted for in the Blockchain, you cannot double count, double deal, lie, cheat, steal or deceivingly overleverage - in other words the typical Wall Street bank business model is fractured!

 

This means my potential inability to write artciles such as these: Lies, Damn Lies, and Sovereign Truths: Why the Euro is Destined to Collapse! or Once You Catch a Few EU Countries “Stretching the Truth”, Why Should You Trust the Rest?

To think, all of this wording... and I'm just getting to the bottom of the first page of this report! If you want me to address the rest, simply give me the heads up in the comment section below - and...

If you want to contribute to the further education of Mr. Normand and JP Morgan, contibute to the UtlraCoin crowdfunding effort here. As you can see from this article, Reggie Middleton's UltraCoin is no mere alternative cryptocurrency. I fully intend to disintermediate the typical Wall Street bank through this technology by elimintating them as the unnecessary, full friction, inefficient and costly (where do you think those $20 million bonuses come from?) middlemen that they are. Remember, THEIR profit margin is MY business model! Click here to crowdfund the disintermediation of Wall Street!

Oh yeah, Mr. Normand, if you ever want to debate Bitcoin in public, I'm game. Let's dance! 

 ultramini

My Twitter Updates

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ReggieMiddleton @rwfortunato Depending on how things go at the hearing, I may definitely take you up on that offer. Legal fees are… https://t.co/M8H78M0up8
Thursday, 22 August 2019 12:45
ReggieMiddleton @CryptoNana4MAGA @ArcadiaEconomic Thank you all. The court date has been moved to Monday, the 26th.
Thursday, 22 August 2019 04:43
ReggieMiddleton Our response to SEC allegations has been filed and is now public. While it may appear voluminous, it should be cons… https://t.co/f3SH6jTNpo
Tuesday, 20 August 2019 10:17
ReggieMiddleton Asia Surprises With Cuts in Global Race to Monetary Bottom: New Zealand, India, Thailand cut rates today, which cau… https://t.co/bdY8cZqYqZ
Wednesday, 07 August 2019 11:05
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ReggieMiddleton @fortunekr75 @venmo We have our own internal USD token. We actually use our metal tokens as private currency for transactions.
Tuesday, 06 August 2019 14:41

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