Monday, 20 May 2019

A Analysis

 If you haven't heard, we're giving out free, fully smart contracts as a 5% rebate to anyone who purchases any of our research packages above the introductory novice $50 level. This is not your Daddy's rebate! The rebate actually gets larger as DB goes down in price. For those who may be coming late to the party, we can offer a 5x long gold (or even a long gold, short DB) smart contract rebate as well. Of course, the bulk of our research targets banks and entities other than DB, but I thought we'd make DB the subject of the rebate to drive the point home. Below is an actual contract crafted off of the price of a single share of DB for about 2 weeks.

Veritaseum 5x Short DB Smart Contract

Click here to explore and subscribe to our research. You will have to be willing to fully identify yourself and comply to the terms or our program (in essence, promise not to use the package for anything other than our rebate) in order to qualify for the rebate. Once the subsciption is paid for, email us to get started.

Oh yeah, if you haven't heard...

An Analysis of Deutsche Bank's Likely Recapitalization - German Tax Payer Bailout or German Bank Depositor Bail-in?

Deutsche Bank is going to need some money, and it's going to need some quite soon. The next two or three articles that I write will focus on why there is such a need. In a concerted effort to reduce or potentially eliminated the risk of taxpayer-funded bail-outs of European banks, the EU implemented a new “bail-in” regime beginning on January 1, 2016. As such, rules which require banks and certain systemically significant market participants in EU member states will have to write-down, cancel, convert into equity or otherwise modify certain unsecured liabilities if such steps are required to recapitalize the institution. What is the most bountiful unsecured liabilities of a bank? Read more...

 

Our next article will continue to hammer home the liklhood that DB will have to recapitalize, and where they probably WONT'T be getting the money from, as well as the likelihood it will come from someone who really didn't plan on giving it up (Ahem, depositors/savers/checking account holders). For those who are not yet convinced, peruse these related items...

The research and knowledge subscription module "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation" contains a full report of a very large European Deutsche Bank counterparty that faces a full 27% downside from current levels. It appears as if no one suspects a clue. It also contains much, much more (including at least 3 to 5 suspect banks). We can break this apart a la carte, if requested.

As excerpted:

Susceptible Bank 1: Financial Modeling

 

Deutsche Bank is going to need some money, and it's going to need some quite soon. The next two or three articles that I write will focus on why there is such a need. In a concerted effort to reduce or potentially eliminated the risk of taxpayer-funded bailouts of European banks, the EU implemented a new “bail-in” regime beginning on January 1, 2016. As such, new rules require banks and certain systemically significant market participants in EU member states to write-down, cancel, convert into equity or otherwise modify certain unsecured liabilities if such steps are required to recapitalize the institution. What are the most bountiful unsecured liabilities of a bank?

Screenshot 20160922-081728-picsay

Deutsche Bank is trading at 1/4 its book value. Book value is the measure that the street uses to value banks. Unfortunately, boo value is meaningless for banks today, who's books are no longer marked to market, distorted by negative interest rates and transformed by Harry Potter style accounting. It appears as if the market is not going for it. We, at Veritaseum, never did! Here's an example of why oen should heavily discount DB's book value number. Mortgages are one of the, if not the, biggest loan buckets on DB's balance sheet. Five percent of those mortgages are underwater (guaranteed losses). Seventeen percent are over 70% loan-to-value ration. Well, you may be saying to yourself "That's not bank run material".

The German housing market is on an absolute tear. One could be tempted to say its a bubble, but the German economy is the strongest in all of Europe, right? It's the engine that powers the EU, right? Well, German home prices have handily outgrown, and continue to do so, German wage growth - by a very wide margin. So, if real wages aren't powering these fantastic price gains, then what is???

Geran rates

IF the ECB fails to perfectly juggle all of those negative interest rate balls simultaneously (unlikely) then DB will have a hell of a Bear Stearns/Lehman-like problem on its hands, as housing prices crash and DB's mortgage portfolio goes from 5% underwater (likely quite understated) to something like 30-40% underwater. There goes bank equity and here come bank bail-ins!

The info below is taken from our DB subscription research (see Derivative Risk Exposure of Major Banks to Deutsche Bank). Those who are truly interest in this should purchase our DB counterparty research to see who we feel is the most profitable potential short in the sector. It can be found here -European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation. We can break out the short only research for $500 fi you don't want to subscribe to the entire series.

DB mortgage problem

During the financial crisis of 2008, money market funds who subjectively agreed to hold their NAV (net asset value) unit prices at $1 “broke the buck”. That is, the unit of share of the fund fell below $1 (the $62.5 billion Reserve Fund, to be specific, one of only two funds to “break the buck”), which was a significant problem for the investors who used (and considered) said money market funds as cash in the bank. All of a sudden, everyone’s cash account at the Reserve Fund just dipped in value. Uh Oh! This caused short term credit to literally freeze, worldwide, because others were concerned that their bank-like security and liquidity was no longer that secure nor liquid.

Regulators stepped in to make sure this didn’t happen again by demanding that all money funds who do not invest in sovereign securities (those entities who “should” be able to print their own monies, but we’ll get into that in a later post) allow their NAV to freely float with market prices.

The result? Money flew out of prime money funds into perceived safer vehicles.

Demand for government short term paper has increased (to the tune of hundreds of billion of dollars).

 

... and demand for private commercial paper, ie. banks, have dropped by a similar amount, materially driving costs - materially, as in doubling it!

What does this mean?

No, this is not a punishment. This is actually a good thing, for it forces money to have an appropriately derived price tag attached to it. Risky banks were being funded at the same risk rate as (less risky) sovereign governments. That didn’t make sense. Now the system makes more sense, and banks should be repriced according to their access to, and true cost of, capital. The true cost of capital means that banks can no longer hide behind fake LIBOR quotes to conceal their deteriorating credit metrics. Reference Wikipedia:

The Libor scandal was a series of fraudulent actions connected to the Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate) and also the resulting investigation and reaction. The Libor is an average interest rate calculated through submissions of interest rates by major banks across the world. The scandal arose when it was discovered that banks were falsely inflating or deflating their rates so as to profit from trades, or to give the impression that they were more creditworthy than they were.[3] Libor underpins approximately $350 trillion in derivatives. It is currently administered by NYSE Euronext, which took over running the Libor in January 2014.[4]

Look at what happened to LIBOR consistently after NYSE Euronext took over adminstration. Those spikes that you see previous to that takeover stem from the European sovereign debt crisis. Those numbers had been faked! No telling what the true level of stress really was. Well, this time around we may get to find out. To put this into perspective, the global money market industry is $2.6 trillion in assets. Deutsche Bank’s (a bank that is in trouble) balance sheet is almost $2 trillion dollars. JP Morgan’s balance sheet is $2.4 trillion dollars. Both of these banks have been shrinking their balance sheets.

As excerpted from Bloomberg:

With a seismic overhaul of the $2.6 trillion money-market industry weeks away from kicking in, money managers are bracing for a last-minute exodus of as much as $300 billion from funds in regulators’ cross hairs.

Prime funds, which seek higher yields by buying securities like commercial paper, are at the center of the upheaval. Their assets have already plunged by almost $700 billion since the start of 2015, to $789 billion, Investment Company Institute data show. The outflow has rippled across financial markets, shattering demand for banks’ and other companies’ short-term debt and raising their funding costs.

Interestingly enough, and as is par for the course, we see things differently from the Street, as also excerpted:

Financial firms paying higher rates to attract investors to their IOUs will push three-month Libor to about 0.95 percent by the end of September, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Click here to read more about rising Libor rates.

Although bank funding costs are rising, it isn’t a signal of financial strain as in 2008, said Jerome Schneider, head of short-term portfolio management at Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co., which oversees about $1.5 trillion.

“This is not a credit stress event, it’s a credit repricing due to systemic and structural changes,” he said.

He’s right. It’s not a credit stress event… yet! But, the credit repricing will force a reality and discipline on an industry accustomed to near zero and negative interest rates that it is ill-fitted to handle, and thus in due time, it will likely provide at least a partial impetus for… “a credit stress event”.

NiM (net interest margin - the profit from actual old school banking businesses, ie. lending) is still quite sparse in banks. So, revenue is slim, but expenses to access said capital to conduct business are going up. That's never a good sign. Worse yet, the Fed has signalled it will, yet again, hold off on an interest rate increase - As I have been telling you since December of 2014.

The issue is, the Fed does not truly control the market, it simply manipulates it to the best of its ability. When it's ready, the market will raise rates on its own. Reference where short term rates are trending now, likely as reflection of the Fed not raising rates.

This is particularly true for the European banks...

Our next post will describe how well Deutsche Bank is prepared for such an event. Stay tuned, and if you have not already done so, subscribe to our long/short, macro and educational research (including blockchain tech) - see Corporate Valuation & Equity Research.

We have a brand new DB report out today, reference Derivative Risk Exposure of Major Banks to Deutsche Bank.

Following up on Deutsche Bank as Ground Zero?, I'd like to focus on the deteriorating credit metrics at Germany's largest bank. To be absolutely honest, an educatied consumer is the at odds with the bank's other stakeholders in this situation. Educated consumers, particularly those seeking safe, secure bank accounts and lending faciilities should be moving out of Deutshe bank right now. DB is far from safe and secure, particularly in relation to other destiniations. Remember, bank bail-ins are EU law now. European regulatory authorities can force these failing institutions to cancel or severely dilute shareholder equity or to cancel, write-down or convert unsecured liabilities to equity. Such regulatory action is referred to as a “bail-in.” Bank depositors (checking, savings, demand accounts) are investors as well, in the form of unsecured creditors. 

Most depositors still don't realize this (despite Icelandic bank depositors getting smashed). Depositors are the largest, one of the cheapest, and currently the most stable form of bank financing.

DB credit matrix

Most depositors, when they realize they actually are investors, should head to safer pastures. This will leave a gaping whole in Deustche Bank where 312 euros once stood. Let's recent how I described The Anatomy Of A European Bank Run: Look At The Banking Situation BEFORE The Run Occurs:

... Below is a chart excerpted from our most recent work showing the asset/liability funding mismatch of a bank detailed within the report. The actual name of the bank is not at issue here. What is at issue is what situation this bank has found itself in and why it is in said situation after both Lehman and Bear Stearns collapsed from the EXACT SAME PROBLEM!

image015

 

... The problem then is the same as the European problem now, leveraging up to buy assets that have dropped precipitously in value and then lying about it until you cannot lie anymore. You see, the lies work on everybody but your counterparties - who actually want to see cash!

image012

... The modern central banking system has proven resilient enough to fortify banks against depositor runs, as was recently exemplified in the recent depositor runs on UK, Irish, Portuguese and Greek banks – most of which received relatively little fanfare. Where the risk truly lies in today’s fiat/fractional reserve banking system is the run on counterparties. Today’s global fractional reserve bank get’s more financing from institutional counterparties than any other source save its short term depositors.  In cases of the perception of extreme risk, these counterparties are prone to pull funding are request overcollateralization for said funding. This is what precipitated the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the pulling of liquidity by skittish counterparties, and the excessive capital/collateralization calls by other counterparties. Keep in mind that as some counterparties and/or depositors pull liquidity, covenants are tripped that often demand additional capital/collateral/ liquidity be put up by the remaining counterparties, thus daisy-chaining into a modern day run on the bank!

image006

 The research and knowledge subscription module "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation" contains a full report of a very large European Deustche Bank counterparty that faces a full 27% downside from current levels. It appears as if no one suspects a clue. It also contains much, much more (including at least 3 to 5 suspect banks). We can break this apart a la carte, if requested.

As excerpted:

Susceptible Bank 1: Financial Modeling

 

Friday, 09 September 2016 16:25

Deutsche Bank as Ground Zero?

Wells Fargo was recently fined $185 million for opening over a million fake accounts and credit cards. This got a lot of attention in the media. It is our assention that Deustche Bank's situation is far more worthy of attention.

DB credit woes

We all know how I feel about credit agencies...

Well, as slow as the ratings agencies are to pull the trigger, even they have downgraded DB to "subprime"...

Subscribe to European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation to access our research on the Deutsche Bank counterparty that has a 27% potential downside near to medium term. It is one of the most thorough analyses of a bank that you are likely to ever have seen. Remember, we the guys to call Bear, Lehman, Countrywide and WaMu.

We are releasing new information on Deutsche Bank three times per week, with new free content and analysis coming out this weekend. In the meantime, this is what you may have missed:

This is the 4th installment of our public service announcements on Deutsche Bank subsidiary, Xetra-Gold's gold note offerings. Since a lot has been covered already, it's advisable that you read the first 3 articles to catch up:

  1. Veritaseum Knowledge Exposes Frightening Counterparty Risk At Deutsche Bank for "Gold Investors"
  2. Is Deutsche Bank Prepping for Fraud Charges Against It's Gold Derivative Products?
  3. The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold

Now, that we have determined that Deutsche Bank subsidiary Xetra-Gold "may" not have been fraudulent, mainly because they stated in their prospectus things that contradict and befuddle the misleading things they stated in their marketing material, we are left to ponder, "Well, we know the offering was unethical, but was it illegal?" Unfortunately, I'm not a lawyer thus cannot accurately opine on such. Alas, I can speculate as a laymen. The Xetra-Gold derivatives were offered in the UK, as well as several other jurisdictions. Let's peruse the UK perspective via the FCA in the difference between clear and misleading financial advertising:

"Financial adverts and promotions can be misleading for many reasons, but there are some questions you can consider to help you spot and avoid misleading financial adverts, such as: ... Are there important points that are only shown in the small print?"

Hmm... Let's take a look at the Xetra-Gold advertisement, and cross reference it to it's prospectus:

DB Xetra-Gold false advertising test

You guys tell me, is this a blatant case of false advertising, or is it not? Let me know in the comment section below. It's not as if DB is totally innocent in these matters, for they just signed a consent order admitting the manipulation of gold prices. This goes deeper than many may care to admit. Deutsche bank seems to be dumping its gold exposure, and what better way to dump it than to sell it unsuspecting gold derivative note buyers. This is how it could be going down...

Deutsche Bank, through it's Xetra-Gold subsidiary, has a guaranteed, zero premium call option.

  1. DB/Xetra-Gold accepts money from investors who are told they are buying gold, from “an economic perspective”.
  2. DB/Xetra-Gold takes money that was supposed to buy gold (at least in the eyes of many investors) and does whatever they want with it (which could include buying gold) because gold delivery on demand is not guaranteed and the investors have been disclaimed against ownership of, and rights to, the gold underlying as well as price correlation, and failure to deliver.
  3. If the price of gold goes up, DB/Xetra-Gold can fail to deliver (as disclaimed) and keep the capital gains profits. They don't even have to match the price of the gold underlying. or return the initial investment.
  4. If the price of gold goes down, DB can deliver gold on demand and keep the spread from gold spot and the price originally charged for the gold notes.

This is good work, if you can get it, no? 

This is how a company like DB can have over 90% in profitable trading days, because they never had a chance of losing in the first place. The losses belong to their clients! This is speculation, of course (wink, wink). Now, legal eagles say that we can't scream fraud, because Deutsche clearly says they have the motivation to, and the ability to, rip you off in their prospectus (but not in their marketing materials).

DB

Which leads us to the end of "The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold", where John Titus (see his videos at the end of this article at the bottom) explained to me after I queried about misleading and contradictory marketing materials:

I asked, "If marketing materials are negatively contradicted by the prospectus then the marketing materials are fraudulent and misrepresentative, no?" He replied...

Misrepresentative, yes (accepting your definition of economic), and the marketing materials probably do in fact flout any number of laws against false advertising.
 
But fraudulent, no. The essence of fraud is to falsely induce someone by words or acts into doing something against his interests that he wouldn't have done but for the dishonesty. Courts consider the totality of the circumstances. So while you would undoubtedly tear the economic investment statement to shreds, you'd still be left with the many other statements from the prospectus that are true, and herein lies the problem.
 
The UK Fraud Act of 2006 is a criminal statute. So each element of the crime has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (or whatever the English equivalent burden of proof is). The first element of fraud by false representation under the Act is "dishonestly makes a false representation." The problem posed by the prospectus is that it would preclude a finding that DB acted dishonestly beyond a reasonable doubt. I mean, you've got one false (but arguably vague) statement vs. several clear-cut disclaimers that are accurate. The totality of the statements are perhaps half false and half true, but dishonest beyond a reasonable doubt? Fuhgetaboutit. DB played the game with all of its cards face up. Yeah, they contradicted each other, but they were damn sure visible to investors, who can claim they were misled only in a subjective (personal) sense, not in an objective way (which is how a judge would look at it).
 
Now, if--in addition to the mktg mat's and the prospectus--you've got some Goldman-like behavior where DB took out massive insurance policies on the investments it sold and concealed them from the buyer, it's a totally different story."

Hmmm... On that note, let's take a look at whether DB has been a net buyer or net seller of gold exposure. Remember, Goldman, sold MBS structures to clients and then took big short positions betting against their own clients, reference "Goldman 'bet against securities it sold to clients'.

The subcommittee also released four internal Goldman Sachs emails. In one, says a subcommittee statement: "Goldman employees discussed the ups and downs of securities that were underwritten and sold by Goldman and tied to mortgages issued by Washington Mutual Bank's sub-prime lender, Long Beach Mortgage Company. Reporting the 'wipe-out' of one Long Beach security and the 'imminent' collapse of another as 'bad news' that would cost the firm $2.5m, a Goldman Sachs employee then reported the 'good news' – that the failure would bring the firm $5m from a bet it had placed against the very securities it had assembled and sold."

Goldman is fighting to clear its name after the $1bn fraud charges brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission last week, and wants the case settled in court.

The movie, "The Big Short" dramatized this rather well.

Well, guess what it looks like Deustche has been doing...

DB gold exposure expressed as VaRDeustche has been a net seller of foreign exchange risk, which includes (wait for it now, and guess....) gold! They probably were not cash sellers, but purchased swaps to reduce exposure, possibly along the parameters I mentioned above with the guaranteed, zero premium call option.

If you enjoy this free analysis, there's much more where this came from as we pick apart many other banks in our paid research and knowledge modules. WE just finished a true forensic valuation (very extensive, and detailed analysis) of a very large European bank that led to a huge short recommendation. Subscribe here and pass the word. Our bank analyses have performed very well in 2016, with Banco Popular and Banco Popular Milano doing roughly 40% to 80% in theoretical returns (contingent on how the positions were taken). We have done an excellent job historically as well, calling the fall of Bear Stearns, Lehman, Countrywide, GGP, etc. If you think the free stuff is intense, you should see the stuff that we sell!

We have forensically picked apart Deutsche Bank in a way that no other entity ever has, likely including Deutsche Bank itself. While we may not know all of its secrets, we likely now know more than almost everybody else. We will publish our findings to Veritaseum Knowledge clients early this week, but in the meantime we will put little teasers out to the public for the sake of conversation. "Why?", you may ask. Well, everybody already knows that Deutsche Bank is a basket case, but we are showing our clients that the real short opportunities and true systemic risks lie within DB's counterparties, whom have identified and are in the process of putting share price targets on. The first forensic report on the most proximal counterparty with an elevated share price is done, and the first counterparty share price target will be published to European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation subscribers within 48 hours. There are several more to follow. In the meantime and in between time, let's discuss Deutsche in detail that you will find nowhere else on the web or on Wall Street.

Last week we illustrated what appears to be a slam dunk finding of Deutsche Bank fraud under the UK Fraud Act of 2006, reference "Veritaseum Knowledge Exposes Frightening Counterparty Risk At Deutsche Bank for "Gold Investors"". In said piece, we tracked down DB's alleged failure to deliver physical gold upon demand redemption of one of it's subsidiary's gold derivative instruments and superimposed it against DB's counterparty risk and blatant contradictions between it's marketing material (ie. website) and it's prospectus (which itself actually had material and confusing contradictions) - as excerpted:

  • ..."an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold", but
    • "No correlation with the gold price", and 
    • and "The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold", but
    • "For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes)." - keeping in mind that Deutsche Bank believes 
    • There's no movement in counterparty risks yearly, or cumulatively, due to collateralization (where said collateral is wide open to market forces and valuations) for instruments.
    • No control of genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold Neither the Issuer nor the Depositary Agent or any other agent of the Issuer will control the genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer by Clearstream Banking AG in its capacity as Depositary Agent.

Oh, there's more, for those of you who believed that line "an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold". 

The purchasers of the Notes will only acquire the rights securitised by the Notes. The purchasers of the Notes will not acquire any title to, or security interests or beneficial ownership in, the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer. An investment in the Notes does not constitute a purchase or other acquisition of Gold.

This comment excerpts the requirements of the UK Fraud Act of 2006, since the DB derivative issue was sold to UK investors. It clearly shows the material uncovered in our article can garner the label of fraud in the UK. There''s actually much more in the article if you click the aforereferenced link, but I believe many can get the message. So, where does this leave us? Well, it appears as if DB is prepping for a rash of fraud and litigation exposure. Looking at numbers buried deep within DB's more than 650 pages of financial reporting (just for the 2015 annual report), we find their disclosure of operational risk.

DB Operational risk 2015

'Profit and loss based operational losses increased by € 3.3 billion or 133 % compared to year-end 2014. The increase was predominantly driven by the event types “Clients, Products and Business Practices” and “Internal Fraud”, due to settlements reached and increased litigation reserves for unsettled cases. The increase in the event type “External Fraud” is caused by a provision for equity trading fraud.

As we drill down even further, we see even more damning information. From a frequency perspective. external fraud is the king. It happened more than any other type of operational loss, and for the year 2015, has almost matched the frequency of the previous 5 years combined. What is going on in a bank to cause such a dramatic uptick in fraud? 

To make matters worse, the clients, products and business practices losses (basically fraud, from our perspective) has almost doubled that of the previous 5 years - and that's just for the fiscal year 2015! The saga continues, and gets even darker. When looking at the distribution of actual losses, "Clients, Products & Business Practices" not only takes the lions share of the pie, but 2015 alone has matched the previous 5 years combined. What the hell is going on in this bank? More importantly, why is it getting so much worse?

DB Operational losses by event type 2015

 

This is how DB framed it:

"The above left pie chart “Frequency of Operational Losses” summarizes operational risk events which occurred in 2015 compared to the five-year period 2010-2014 in brackets based on the period in which a loss was first recognized for that event. For example, for a loss event that was first recognized in 2002 with an additional profit/loss event recognized in 2015, the frequency chart would not include the loss event, but the loss distribution chart would include the profit/loss recognized in the respective period. Frequencies are driven by the event type “External Fraud” with a frequency of 44 % of all observed loss events. The event types “Clients, Product and Business Practices” contribute 42 % of the events and “Execution, Delivery and Process Management” contribute 11 %. Others are stable at 2 %. The event type “Internal Fraud” has a low frequency, resulting in less than 1 % of the loss events in the period 2015. This is unchanged compared to 2010-2014. The above right pie chart “Distribution of Operational Losses” summarizes operational risk loss postings recognized in the profit/loss in 2015 compared to the five-year period 2010-2014. The event type “Clients, Product and Business Practices” dominates the operational loss distribution with a share of 63 % and is determined by outflows related to litigation, investigations and enforcement actions. “Internal Fraud” has the second highest share (23 %) which is related to regulatory events we have experienced in recent years. Finally, the event types “External Fraud” (8 %) and “Execution, Delivery and Process Management” (5 %) can be considered minor, compared to other event types."

What DB failed to point out was that although "Internal Fraud" consisted of just 1% of the occurrences, it represented 23% of the loss amount of 2015, which is ~10% more than the previous 5 years combined, which was in itself still significantly more expensive than all of the other categories. 

This bank is a  mess. As for the source of all of these numbers, let's display it in words so all can get a different perspective...

Legal Actions by the Counterparties since 2014 (that's right, this is just since 2014):

There are some incidents where Deutsche bank is defendant in various lawsuits by purchasers and counterparties who were involved in transactions relating to RMBS and their affiliates. Some of the counterparties who faced damages are:

  • Azora Bank Ltd :

Damage of US$61 million attributable to Deutsche bank

  • The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:

They filed a lawsuit against Deutsche bank as receiver of

  • Colonial bank whose damage amount is around US$189 million

  • Franklin Bank S.S.B and Guaranty Bank; where the damage amount is almost US$901 million

  • Citizens National Bank and Strategic Capital Bank; aggregate loss is around US$66 million

  • The federal Home loan bank of San Francisco

  • Phoenix light SF Limited

  • Royal Park Investments

  • Residential Funding Company

  • Mass Mutual Life insurance company

  • The federal Home loan bank of Boston and The federal Home loan bank of Des Moines

  • RBMS Recovery Holdings 4, LLC

  • VP structured Products, LLC

  • Texas County & District Retirement system for 4 RMBS bonds underwritten by Deutsche Bank

  • Charles Schwab Corporation for purchasing countrywide- issued RMBS certificate

  • Trustee civil Litigation investors

  • Royal park Investments

  • The national credit Union Administration Board (NCUA) for investing in 121 RMBS trusts

  • Western and Southern life Insurance company and five related entities( collectively known as Western and Southern) for 18 RMBS trusts

  • Commerzbank AG for investments in 50 RMBS trusts

  • IKB (IKB International, S.A in Liquidation and IKB Deutsche Industriebank A.G.) for their collective investments in 37 RMBS trusts

To get the heavy dirt on many of the leading EU area banks, US tech companies, and real estate concerns (not to mention the latest in blockchain technology), subscribe to Veritaseum Knowledge - in depth, extremely detailed knowledge (vs information) not available anywhere else in the world.

 Let me ask you a question. If you were a prospective gold investor, and were not a client of Veritaseum Knowledge, would you buy these gold instruments?Deuscthe Borse Commodities prospectus

Well, clients of Deustche Bank et. al. certainly did. Reference this story from RT.com: Deutsche Bank refuses clients' demand for physical gold

Clients of Germany’s biggest bank who have invested in the exchange-traded commodity Xetra-Gold are facing problems when they want to obtain physical gold, according to German analytic website Godmode-Trader.de.
Xetra-Gold is a bond on the Deutsche Börse commodities market, and Deutsche Bank is a designated sponsor. On the website, Xetra-Gold says its clients have the right for physical delivery of gold...
“Physically backed: The issuer uses the proceeds from the issue of Xetra-Gold to purchase gold. The physical gold is held in custody for the issuer in the Frankfurt vaults of Clearstream Banking AG, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Deutsche Börse. In order to facilitate the delivery of physical gold, the issuer holds a further limited amount of gold on an unallocated weight account with Umicore AG & Co.,” says Xetra-Gold.
However, despite claims that every virtual gram of gold is backed by the same amount of physical gold, clients have been refused the precious metal upon demand.
According to Godmode Trader, its reader “sought physical delivery of his holdings of Xetra-Gold. For this he approached, as instructed by the German Börse document, his principal bank, Deutsche Bank." However, he was told that “the service” was no longer available for "reasons of business policy". The article went on to say it’s not yet clear whether other banks are still delivering gold through Xetra.

The website's marketing material is clear enough...

DB Xetra Gold

The issuer of Xetra Gold is an entity jointly owned by Germany's Commerzbank & Deutsche Bank (rumored to be merging - Yechh!), among others. Uh Oh!

Deuscthe Borse Commodities

In the Deutsche Borse Xetra Prospectus under the heading "Key information on the key risks that are specific to the Notes", you will find the following snippet:

Upon acquisition of Notes, an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold and thus bears the market risk associated therewith.

This statement is simply not true, and it's amazing that it passed muster with legal counsel and auditors. Why? Because the following line in the prospectus literally says:

"No correlation with the gold price"

Let's look at this a bit more closely, shall we...

The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold. For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes).

Hmmm... It sounds as if the gold is actually held on the balance sheet of the note issuers. If that's true, then this is not an investment in gold, it's and investment of a derivative of gold exposure and the balance sheet exposure of the issuer. Now, how many of the so-called "investors" of these derivatives got that concept BEFORE they bought in???

Deuscthe Borse Commodities prospectus - counterparty risks

Now, you guys (and girls) tell me, do we have reason to suspect credit and solvency issues at the Issuer,'s parent, Deutsche Bank? Let's refer to notes available to subscribers of Veritaseum Knowledge, in particular, the European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation module... 

DB Cojunterpary risk shift 2

Actually, DB doesn't think we should concern ourselves with things such as adjustements for credit risks or credit worthiness...

Deusstche loan valuation 2

So, with the aforementioned understanding, let's move on through the prospectus...

"The value of a Note will therefore not necessarily equal exactly the value of one gram of Gold at any given time."

"No rights or beneficial ownership in the Gold"

So, let's add these up now...

  • ..."an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold", but
    • "No correlation with the gold price", and 
    • and "The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold", but
    • "For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes)." - keeping in mind that Deutsche Bank believes 
    • There's no movement in counterparty risks yearly, or cumulatively, due to collateralization (where said collateral is wide open to market forces and valuations) for instruments.

Oh yeah! If I were hired as an expert witness, this stuff could get ugly.... As for now, methinks its time to go put shopping again.

Oh, there's more, for those of you who believed that line "an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold". 

The purchasers of the Notes will only acquire the rights securitised by the Notes. The purchasers of the Notes will not acquire any title to, or security interests or beneficial ownership in, the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer. An investment in the Notes does not constitute a purchase or other acquisition of Gold.

Here's some more risks, this time due to liquidity of the derivatives....

Tradeability No assurance can be given that the admission of the Notes to the regulated market (General Standard) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange will continue or that the Notes will continuously be traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Consequently, there is the risk that sale of the Notes on an exchange may not, or not at all times, be possible.

In reference to actually getting what you're paying not to own...

No control of genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold Neither the Issuer nor the Depositary Agent or any other agent of the Issuer will control the genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer by Clearstream Banking AG in its capacity as Depositary Agent. As the party responsible for all physical delivery processes, Umicore AG & Co. KG will be liable for the genuineness and fineness of the physical Gold acquired by the Issuer with the proceeds from the issue. If the physical Gold which is held in custody by Clearstream Banking AG as Depositary Agent of the Issuer is not genuine or if its fineness does not comply with the requirements specified in the rules adopted by The London Bullion Market Association (or a successor organisation representing market participants in the London gold trading market) for the delivery of gold bars, as amended from time to time and which, at the date of this Prospectus, provide for a minimum fineness of 995 parts per 1000 pure gold, the Notes might only be covered by the aforementioned liability claims against Umicore AG & Co. KG as the party responsible for all physical delivery processes. Market disruptions If the Calculation Agent determines that a market disruption has occurred or continues to exist at any given time, the Issuer will not fulfil its delivery or payment obligations until the Calculation Agent determines that the relevant market disruption has ceased to exist. Any such determination may delay 16 fulfilment by the Issuer of its delivery or payment obligations

Become a member of Veritaseum Knowledge now, and subscribe to the knowledge module European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation. There's much, much, much more to this story than meets the eye. More apparently, there are many more European banks and institutions involved - in countries you'd likely never suspect. We suspect some of them will be going pop in the not too distant future. This is from the team that called Bear Stearns, Lehman, GGP and nearly all of the significant financial institution failures of the 2008 crash.

 

 

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