Wednesday, 21 August 2019

A Analysis

I was discussing the US Department of Justice $14B fine levied at Deutsche Bank with my 15 year old son last week. I told him the fine amounted to roughly 70% of Deutsche's market cap, while a similar retroactive tax levy from the EU towards Apple for $14B was about 3% of their cash on hand or a quarter's operating profit.  My son said, "Whoah! Waitaminute! I thought Deutsche Bank was a big company like Apple. Didn't you say that they had trillions of euros of assets on their balance sheet?".

Indeed, I did say such, and he brings up a very valid point that is missed by many a so-called professional. DB is valued at 14.5 billion euros by Mrs Market, yet that amount controlls 1.8 trillion euros worth of assets, and 1.415 trillion after netting and credit adjustments, etc. And to think, some people think a 90 LTV loan is pushing the leverate limiit. Let's take a look at this from a graphica perspective to illustrate just how absurd it is...

Over time, the accounting expression of equity diverges significantly from the markets perception of the bank's equity value.  Somebody is most assuredly mistaken! As of today, DB's books are carrying equity value at 3x that of the stock market. DB market leverage

 

If one were to use the stock market's equity valuation, one would see that a very, very tiny sliver of equity is controlling nearly 1.5 trillion euro of assets - and that's after the slimming down game is done. Expressed differently, DB is leveaged 97.4x. 

DB market-based leverage Ratio

For those who feel this is an unrealistice way of looking at things, run the same exercise for every failed bank and cross reference the results to that of the European banking regulatory body's methodology of calculating leverage and tell me which methid was (and is) the better predictor of bank failure.

Leverage ratio measures
(In EUR bn., unless stated otherwise) Dec 31, 2014 Mar 31, 2015 Jun 30, 2015 Sep 30, 2015 Dec 31, 2015 Mar 31, 2016 Jun 30, 2016 Sep 28, 2016
                 
Total assets 1,709 1,955 1,694 1,719 1,629 1,741 1,803 1,803
Changes from IFRS to CRR/CRD41 (264) (407) (233) (299) (234) (350)
(389)
(389)
Derivatives netting1 (562) (668) (480) (508) (460) (523) (556) (556)
Derivatives add-on1 221 227 198 177 166 157 157 157
Written credit derivatives1 65 58 45 42 30 31 24 24
Securities Financing Transactions1 16 20 21 22 25 25 35 35
Off-balance sheet exposure after application of credit conversion factors1 127 134 131 109 109 102 102 102
Consolidation, regulatory and other adjustments1 (131) (177) (148) (140) (104) (140) (151) (151)
CRR/CRD4 leverage exposure measure (spot value at reporting date)1 1,445 1,549 1,461 1,420 1,395 1,390 1,415 1,415
                 
Total equity 73.2 77.9 75.7 68.9 67.6 66.6 66.8 66.8
Market share Price$ 30.0 44.8 30.2 27.0 24.2 16.9 13.7 11.9
Market Cap$ 41.1 61.4 41.3 36.9 33.1 23.2 18.8 16.3
Market Cap EUR 36.6 54.7 36.8 32.9 29.4 20.7 16.7 14.5
Discrspency bet. Accounting & Market-based Equity 50% 30% 51% 52% 56% 69% 75% 78%
Simple, market price derived leverage (Equity/Net Assets) 2.53% 3.53% 2.52% 2.31% 2.11% 1.49% 1.18% 1.03%
Regulatory Accounting (Fully loaded CRR/CRD4 Leverage Ratio in %1) 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Leverge Multiple 39.5x 28.3x 39.7x 43.2x 47.4x 67.3x 84.5x 97.4x
                 
Fully Loaded CRR/CRD4 Tier 1 capital2 50.7 52.5 51.9 51.5 48.7 47.3
48.0
48.0
 
               
Fully loaded CRR/CRD4 Leverage Ratio in %1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4
1 Based on current CRR/CRD 4 rules (including amendments with regard to leverage ratio of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/62 published in the Official Journal of the European Union on January 17, 2015).
2 Regulatory capital amounts, risk weighted assets and capital ratios are based upon CRR/CRD 4 fully-loaded.
 
Here's my DB warning from 11 and half months ago...
 Our next article will continue to hammer home the liklhood that DB will have to recapitalize, and where they probably WONT'T be getting the money from, as well as the likelihood it will come from someone who really didn't plan on giving it up (Ahem, depositors/savers/checking account holders). For those who are not yet convinced, peruse these related items...

Here's What A Real, Live Veritaseum 5x Short DB Smart Contract Looks Like to Our Research Subscribers 

 If you haven't heard, we're giving out free, fully smart contracts as a 5% rebate to anyone who purchases any of our research packages above the introductory novice $50 level. This is not your Daddy's rebate! The rebate actually gets larger as DB goes down in price. For those who may be coming late to the party, we can offer a 5x long gold (or even a long gold, short DB) smart contract rebate as well. Of course, the bulk of our research targets banks and entities other than DB, but I thought we'd make DB the subject of the rebate to drive the point home. Below is an actual contract crafted off of the price of a single share of DB for about 2 weeks.

 

The research and knowledge subscription module "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation" contains a full report of a very large European Deutsche Bank counterparty that faces a full 27% downside from current levels. It appears as if no one suspects a clue. It also contains much, much more (including at least 3 to 5 suspect banks). We can break this apart a la carte, if requested.

As excerpted:

Susceptible Bank 1: Financial Modeling

This is the 4th installment of our public service announcements on Deutsche Bank subsidiary, Xetra-Gold's gold note offerings. Since a lot has been covered already, it's advisable that you read the first 3 articles to catch up:

  1. Veritaseum Knowledge Exposes Frightening Counterparty Risk At Deutsche Bank for "Gold Investors"
  2. Is Deutsche Bank Prepping for Fraud Charges Against It's Gold Derivative Products?
  3. The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold

Now, that we have determined that Deutsche Bank subsidiary Xetra-Gold "may" not have been fraudulent, mainly because they stated in their prospectus things that contradict and befuddle the misleading things they stated in their marketing material, we are left to ponder, "Well, we know the offering was unethical, but was it illegal?" Unfortunately, I'm not a lawyer thus cannot accurately opine on such. Alas, I can speculate as a laymen. The Xetra-Gold derivatives were offered in the UK, as well as several other jurisdictions. Let's peruse the UK perspective via the FCA in the difference between clear and misleading financial advertising:

"Financial adverts and promotions can be misleading for many reasons, but there are some questions you can consider to help you spot and avoid misleading financial adverts, such as: ... Are there important points that are only shown in the small print?"

Hmm... Let's take a look at the Xetra-Gold advertisement, and cross reference it to it's prospectus:

DB Xetra-Gold false advertising test

You guys tell me, is this a blatant case of false advertising, or is it not? Let me know in the comment section below. It's not as if DB is totally innocent in these matters, for they just signed a consent order admitting the manipulation of gold prices. This goes deeper than many may care to admit. Deutsche bank seems to be dumping its gold exposure, and what better way to dump it than to sell it unsuspecting gold derivative note buyers. This is how it could be going down...

Deutsche Bank, through it's Xetra-Gold subsidiary, has a guaranteed, zero premium call option.

  1. DB/Xetra-Gold accepts money from investors who are told they are buying gold, from “an economic perspective”.
  2. DB/Xetra-Gold takes money that was supposed to buy gold (at least in the eyes of many investors) and does whatever they want with it (which could include buying gold) because gold delivery on demand is not guaranteed and the investors have been disclaimed against ownership of, and rights to, the gold underlying as well as price correlation, and failure to deliver.
  3. If the price of gold goes up, DB/Xetra-Gold can fail to deliver (as disclaimed) and keep the capital gains profits. They don't even have to match the price of the gold underlying. or return the initial investment.
  4. If the price of gold goes down, DB can deliver gold on demand and keep the spread from gold spot and the price originally charged for the gold notes.

This is good work, if you can get it, no? 

This is how a company like DB can have over 90% in profitable trading days, because they never had a chance of losing in the first place. The losses belong to their clients! This is speculation, of course (wink, wink). Now, legal eagles say that we can't scream fraud, because Deutsche clearly says they have the motivation to, and the ability to, rip you off in their prospectus (but not in their marketing materials).

DB

Which leads us to the end of "The Debate on the Potential of Fraudulent Actions At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Xetra-Gold", where John Titus (see his videos at the end of this article at the bottom) explained to me after I queried about misleading and contradictory marketing materials:

I asked, "If marketing materials are negatively contradicted by the prospectus then the marketing materials are fraudulent and misrepresentative, no?" He replied...

Misrepresentative, yes (accepting your definition of economic), and the marketing materials probably do in fact flout any number of laws against false advertising.
 
But fraudulent, no. The essence of fraud is to falsely induce someone by words or acts into doing something against his interests that he wouldn't have done but for the dishonesty. Courts consider the totality of the circumstances. So while you would undoubtedly tear the economic investment statement to shreds, you'd still be left with the many other statements from the prospectus that are true, and herein lies the problem.
 
The UK Fraud Act of 2006 is a criminal statute. So each element of the crime has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (or whatever the English equivalent burden of proof is). The first element of fraud by false representation under the Act is "dishonestly makes a false representation." The problem posed by the prospectus is that it would preclude a finding that DB acted dishonestly beyond a reasonable doubt. I mean, you've got one false (but arguably vague) statement vs. several clear-cut disclaimers that are accurate. The totality of the statements are perhaps half false and half true, but dishonest beyond a reasonable doubt? Fuhgetaboutit. DB played the game with all of its cards face up. Yeah, they contradicted each other, but they were damn sure visible to investors, who can claim they were misled only in a subjective (personal) sense, not in an objective way (which is how a judge would look at it).
 
Now, if--in addition to the mktg mat's and the prospectus--you've got some Goldman-like behavior where DB took out massive insurance policies on the investments it sold and concealed them from the buyer, it's a totally different story."

Hmmm... On that note, let's take a look at whether DB has been a net buyer or net seller of gold exposure. Remember, Goldman, sold MBS structures to clients and then took big short positions betting against their own clients, reference "Goldman 'bet against securities it sold to clients'.

The subcommittee also released four internal Goldman Sachs emails. In one, says a subcommittee statement: "Goldman employees discussed the ups and downs of securities that were underwritten and sold by Goldman and tied to mortgages issued by Washington Mutual Bank's sub-prime lender, Long Beach Mortgage Company. Reporting the 'wipe-out' of one Long Beach security and the 'imminent' collapse of another as 'bad news' that would cost the firm $2.5m, a Goldman Sachs employee then reported the 'good news' – that the failure would bring the firm $5m from a bet it had placed against the very securities it had assembled and sold."

Goldman is fighting to clear its name after the $1bn fraud charges brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission last week, and wants the case settled in court.

The movie, "The Big Short" dramatized this rather well.

Well, guess what it looks like Deustche has been doing...

DB gold exposure expressed as VaRDeustche has been a net seller of foreign exchange risk, which includes (wait for it now, and guess....) gold! They probably were not cash sellers, but purchased swaps to reduce exposure, possibly along the parameters I mentioned above with the guaranteed, zero premium call option.

If you enjoy this free analysis, there's much more where this came from as we pick apart many other banks in our paid research and knowledge modules. WE just finished a true forensic valuation (very extensive, and detailed analysis) of a very large European bank that led to a huge short recommendation. Subscribe here and pass the word. Our bank analyses have performed very well in 2016, with Banco Popular and Banco Popular Milano doing roughly 40% to 80% in theoretical returns (contingent on how the positions were taken). We have done an excellent job historically as well, calling the fall of Bear Stearns, Lehman, Countrywide, GGP, etc. If you think the free stuff is intense, you should see the stuff that we sell!

 Let me ask you a question. If you were a prospective gold investor, and were not a client of Veritaseum Knowledge, would you buy these gold instruments?Deuscthe Borse Commodities prospectus

Well, clients of Deustche Bank et. al. certainly did. Reference this story from RT.com: Deutsche Bank refuses clients' demand for physical gold

Clients of Germany’s biggest bank who have invested in the exchange-traded commodity Xetra-Gold are facing problems when they want to obtain physical gold, according to German analytic website Godmode-Trader.de.
Xetra-Gold is a bond on the Deutsche Börse commodities market, and Deutsche Bank is a designated sponsor. On the website, Xetra-Gold says its clients have the right for physical delivery of gold...
“Physically backed: The issuer uses the proceeds from the issue of Xetra-Gold to purchase gold. The physical gold is held in custody for the issuer in the Frankfurt vaults of Clearstream Banking AG, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Deutsche Börse. In order to facilitate the delivery of physical gold, the issuer holds a further limited amount of gold on an unallocated weight account with Umicore AG & Co.,” says Xetra-Gold.
However, despite claims that every virtual gram of gold is backed by the same amount of physical gold, clients have been refused the precious metal upon demand.
According to Godmode Trader, its reader “sought physical delivery of his holdings of Xetra-Gold. For this he approached, as instructed by the German Börse document, his principal bank, Deutsche Bank." However, he was told that “the service” was no longer available for "reasons of business policy". The article went on to say it’s not yet clear whether other banks are still delivering gold through Xetra.

The website's marketing material is clear enough...

DB Xetra Gold

The issuer of Xetra Gold is an entity jointly owned by Germany's Commerzbank & Deutsche Bank (rumored to be merging - Yechh!), among others. Uh Oh!

Deuscthe Borse Commodities

In the Deutsche Borse Xetra Prospectus under the heading "Key information on the key risks that are specific to the Notes", you will find the following snippet:

Upon acquisition of Notes, an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold and thus bears the market risk associated therewith.

This statement is simply not true, and it's amazing that it passed muster with legal counsel and auditors. Why? Because the following line in the prospectus literally says:

"No correlation with the gold price"

Let's look at this a bit more closely, shall we...

The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold. For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes).

Hmmm... It sounds as if the gold is actually held on the balance sheet of the note issuers. If that's true, then this is not an investment in gold, it's and investment of a derivative of gold exposure and the balance sheet exposure of the issuer. Now, how many of the so-called "investors" of these derivatives got that concept BEFORE they bought in???

Deuscthe Borse Commodities prospectus - counterparty risks

Now, you guys (and girls) tell me, do we have reason to suspect credit and solvency issues at the Issuer,'s parent, Deutsche Bank? Let's refer to notes available to subscribers of Veritaseum Knowledge, in particular, the European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation module... 

DB Cojunterpary risk shift 2

Actually, DB doesn't think we should concern ourselves with things such as adjustements for credit risks or credit worthiness...

Deusstche loan valuation 2

So, with the aforementioned understanding, let's move on through the prospectus...

"The value of a Note will therefore not necessarily equal exactly the value of one gram of Gold at any given time."

"No rights or beneficial ownership in the Gold"

So, let's add these up now...

  • ..."an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold", but
    • "No correlation with the gold price", and 
    • and "The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold", but
    • "For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes)." - keeping in mind that Deutsche Bank believes 
    • There's no movement in counterparty risks yearly, or cumulatively, due to collateralization (where said collateral is wide open to market forces and valuations) for instruments.

Oh yeah! If I were hired as an expert witness, this stuff could get ugly.... As for now, methinks its time to go put shopping again.

Oh, there's more, for those of you who believed that line "an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold". 

The purchasers of the Notes will only acquire the rights securitised by the Notes. The purchasers of the Notes will not acquire any title to, or security interests or beneficial ownership in, the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer. An investment in the Notes does not constitute a purchase or other acquisition of Gold.

Here's some more risks, this time due to liquidity of the derivatives....

Tradeability No assurance can be given that the admission of the Notes to the regulated market (General Standard) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange will continue or that the Notes will continuously be traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Consequently, there is the risk that sale of the Notes on an exchange may not, or not at all times, be possible.

In reference to actually getting what you're paying not to own...

No control of genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold Neither the Issuer nor the Depositary Agent or any other agent of the Issuer will control the genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer by Clearstream Banking AG in its capacity as Depositary Agent. As the party responsible for all physical delivery processes, Umicore AG & Co. KG will be liable for the genuineness and fineness of the physical Gold acquired by the Issuer with the proceeds from the issue. If the physical Gold which is held in custody by Clearstream Banking AG as Depositary Agent of the Issuer is not genuine or if its fineness does not comply with the requirements specified in the rules adopted by The London Bullion Market Association (or a successor organisation representing market participants in the London gold trading market) for the delivery of gold bars, as amended from time to time and which, at the date of this Prospectus, provide for a minimum fineness of 995 parts per 1000 pure gold, the Notes might only be covered by the aforementioned liability claims against Umicore AG & Co. KG as the party responsible for all physical delivery processes. Market disruptions If the Calculation Agent determines that a market disruption has occurred or continues to exist at any given time, the Issuer will not fulfil its delivery or payment obligations until the Calculation Agent determines that the relevant market disruption has ceased to exist. Any such determination may delay 16 fulfilment by the Issuer of its delivery or payment obligations

Become a member of Veritaseum Knowledge now, and subscribe to the knowledge module European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation. There's much, much, much more to this story than meets the eye. More apparently, there are many more European banks and institutions involved - in countries you'd likely never suspect. We suspect some of them will be going pop in the not too distant future. This is from the team that called Bear Stearns, Lehman, GGP and nearly all of the significant financial institution failures of the 2008 crash.

 

 

Thursday, 25 August 2016 15:01

How Deutsche Bank Can Destroy Europe

How can Deutsche Bank destroy the EU? Capital fight and extreme, involuntary deleveraging. DB is closing nearly 200 German bank branches. Not a big deal, right? German bank's depositor base is 111% of German GDP. A run on German banks is literally a run on the German economy - the largest economy in Europe...

fredgraph 1

...not to mention a major (the major) funding source for DB's massive derivative positions.  

Current news events don't portend a positive outcome for Germany's largest bank either. Bloomberg reports: NordLB Boosts Shipping Provisions Five-Fold, Warns of High Loss

Norddeutsche Landesbank boosted provisions for bad loans nearly fivefold to 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion), as Germany’s biggest shipping lender prepares for its first full-year loss since 2009.

NordLB, controlled by the state of Lower Saxony, posted a loss of 406 million euros in the first half as it battles a prolonged slump in maritime markets, including eight years of crisis in the container segment. That compares with a profit of 290 million euros in the same period last year.

“The shipping crisis, which further intensified in the first half of the year, has necessitated impairments that were higher than planned,” Chief Executive Officer Gunter Dunkel said in a statement. The bank lowered its outlook for the year, now anticipating a “significant” loss. It had projected a “negative result” in the spring.

... NordLB’s pessimistic view highlights risks at other German banks, which hold roughly one-quarter of the about 400 billion euros in global shipping loans. Under pressure to unwind sour legacy maritime assets, banks including HSH Nordbank AG and Commerzbank AG are also trying to shrink their loan books.

 What does this have to do with Deutsche Bank? A lot! Because everybody wants to sell these assets that aren't considered very desirable, and all at the same time, we've made a bad situation worse - precisely when DB can't afford it.DB mass selling bad shiping loans

Then there's the issue of DB's somewhat questionable assumptions and characteristics in its financial reporting. Deutsche Bank addendums are quoted as saying:

"The credit risk on the securities purchased under resale agreements and securities borrowed designated under the fair value option is mitigated by the holding of collateral. The valuation of these instruments takes into account the credit enhancement in the form of the collateral received. As such there is no material movement during the year or cumulatively due to movements in counterparty credit risk on these instruments."

What???!!! So, the value of collateral doesn't move now? On planet Earth, not only does the value of collateral move, it tends to move in the exact same direction as the value of the loan, borrowing or underlying, often at an exaggerated pace in the beginning (it's markets are the first to know of turmoil). Reference my podcast interview with Max Keiser at the 2:40 marker. Want some more? Read this page from our EU banking report a couple of quarters ago...

For those who don't believe me, I made this call in early 2008 - twice. Once for Bear Stearns (Is this the Breaking of the Bear?) and once for Lehman Brothers (Is Lehman really a lemming in disguise? Thursday, February 21st, 2008 | Web chatter on Lehman Brothers Sunday, March 16th, 2008). Was I right? Of course, that was then and this is now, so the banks are better prepared, right? Of course. The graphic below was taken from our Banco Popular report (click here for more info), not from 8 years ago, but from a quarter ago - yes, 2016! Hey, there's more...

Banco Popular Research teaser3

Now, just imagine that Italy's Banco Popular is the entity that DB used to hedge it's exposure, and Banco Popular (obviously) can't pay up on every(any?)thing. DB's gross exposure become's DB's net exposure as DB's notion value and market value converge near instantaneously if (or when) market shoots off in one direction (you can likely guess what direction that would be for stakeholders, and this time around that includes depositors and bondholders, not just shareholders).

What does this all mean?  Well, we went through this in explicit detail and have identified no less than 6 (and we're still actively looking) financial institutions that may have passed the EBA stress tests, but have miserably failed our examination - and that's without adding in the bank contagion factor!

To partake in this knowledge, join Veritaseum University and purchase the interactive research asset called "European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation".

The Exponential Finance symposium has just ended, and although I didn't attend, Blythe Masters apparently had the hardest hitting presentation. For those who don't know, up until last year she was number two
or three at JP Morgan and is the creator of the credit default swap (CDS). She is now the CEO of a Digital Assets (a Bitcoin technology company). Two quotes, a) "you were the most powerful woman on Wall Street", b) "How Serious should you take this? About as serious as you should have taken the Internet in the early 1990s!"

She is accompanies by many others who are pouring money into this space:

Wednesday, 22 April 2015 00:00

The Unbundling of a Money Center Bank

FinTech investment has been increasing dramatically, and I don't mean just the last year or two...

Is the rapid ramp-up in FinTech funding the dawn of the death of a thousand cuts to the traditional banking business model?

Unbundling of a bank V2 cropped

image006

This is a FinTech panel I joined yesterday with Barry Silbert (SecondMarket, the company that facilitated trading Facebook's private stock, see also Facebook on SecondMarket) & Katina Stefanova (partner at Bridgewater Capital) on Bitcoin Volatility and the Opportunity/Threat to Money Center banks at the 2014 FinTech Startups Conference.

One interesting question that was asked of the panel, but not captured in this video, was...

Where do you think we are today in terms of the state-of-the-union of cryptocurrencies, in terms of acceptance, stability, and reliability as a form of value retention and value transfer in the economy?

 

Acceptance is increasing.

Stability is increasing.

Reliability as form of value retention asks the wrong question. What we need to do is redefine the concept of currency. The static store of value made plenty of sense with the “dumb” fiat model. Now, with the advent of these new inventions, we can “program” the money and create smart contracts that redefine the concept of value. I query, “Is the value in the currency’s embedded contract, or is the value in the currency itself.” More importantly, where is the line of demarcation between the two.

Example, with a “smart” currency, you can  embed bitcoin with the value qualities of any fiat, asset, or even index, thereby further blurring the line.

My Twitter Updates

ReggieMiddleton Our response to SEC allegations has been filed and is now public. While it may appear voluminous, it should be cons… https://t.co/f3SH6jTNpo
About 15 hours ago
ReggieMiddleton Asia Surprises With Cuts in Global Race to Monetary Bottom: New Zealand, India, Thailand cut rates today, which cau… https://t.co/bdY8cZqYqZ
Wednesday, 07 August 2019 11:05
From TweetDeck
ReggieMiddleton @fortunekr75 @venmo We have our own internal USD token. We actually use our metal tokens as private currency for transactions.
Tuesday, 06 August 2019 14:41
ReggieMiddleton @realDonaldTrump labeled china a currencymanipulator, but if one observes objectively, $CNY has held up to… https://t.co/c1XKE0s8ya
Tuesday, 06 August 2019 13:54
From TweetDeck
ReggieMiddleton @venmo Forgot to add this graphic https://t.co/vwb4pZlDmF
Tuesday, 06 August 2019 13:24

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